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Article 3

No Security Through Obscurity
CHANGING CIRCUMVENTION LAW TO PROTECT
OUR DEMOCRACY AGAINST CYBERATTACKS
Andrew Moshirnia†
INTRODUCTION
In just the span of a year, Russian cyberattacks
fundamentally undermined the electoral process of the United
States and plunged Ukraine into darkness, twice.1 Not to be
outdone, as yet unidentified foreign hackers launched
ransomware2 that threatened to cripple hospitals around the
globe.3 It is thus beyond question that 2016 was the most
dangerous year to date for cyberattacks against our critical
national infrastructure. Yet, little attention has been paid to
laws hindering our ability to defend ourselves. In fact, our own
intellectual property law regime has constrained our ability to
prepare for and thwart these attacks.
To date, the problem of national security has been
largely ignored in the intellectual property law regime. Indeed,
the scant attention of state actors has been primarily devoted
to blocking potentially dangerous information from entering

† Senior Lecturer, Monash Business School, Monash University; Empirical
IP Fellow, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author would like to thank Ashley Chung,
Fanxi Wang, Aaron Dozeman, Brian Sheppard, Hank Greenberg, and Rachel Capata
for their assistance.
1 See infra Sections I.A–B.
2 Ransomware encrypts data on a machine and ransoms the data back to the
user by way of decryption. Ransomware has become more prevalent in the last two
years, with fairly popular programs such as CryptXXX, CTB-Locker, and Cerber.
Lawrence Abrams, The Cerber Ransomware Not Only Encrypts Your Data but Also
Speaks to You, BLEEPING COMPUTER (Mar. 3, 2016, 6:09 PM), https://
www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-cerber-ransomware-not-only-encryptsyour-data-but-also-speaks-to-you/ [https://perma.cc/83MB-RVJ3]; Caleb Fenton, New
CryptXXX
Variant
Discovered,
SENTINELONE
(June
27,
2016),
https://sentinelone.com/blogs/new-cryptxxx-variant-discovered/ [https://perma.cc/4VX2SEAK]; The Current State of Ransomware: CTB-Locker, SOPHOS NEWS (Dec. 31, 2015),
https://blogs.sophos.com/2015/12/31/the-current-state-of-ransomware-ctb-locker/
[https://perma.cc/5N6W-Y28D].
3 See infra Section I.C.
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the public sphere.4 The conventional approach of effectuating
national security through intellectual property secrecy is
approximately a century old, evolving from temporarily
suppressing patents during wartime to one of perpetual secrecy in
the face of unending conflict. While employing “security through
obscurity”5 to hide system vulnerabilities may have limited
success in select circumstances, the interconnected nature of
digital infrastructure and the cyber-warfare it invites renders
such an approach foolhardy and dangerous, and leaves security
to chance.
This underlying approach has been co-opted by powerful
rights holders, who may piggyback on the notion of security
through secrecy to attain extra-legal rights in otherwise
constrained fields, such as an independent anticircumvention
right gifted in a purported copyright act.6 Section 1201 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) creates a wholly novel
anticircumvention right that frustrates security and encryption

4 These concerns have spanned atomic secrecy to biological research
publications into “dual use” fields. See Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181, 186
(2000) (prohibiting disclosure of inventions, if the inventions have been ordered kept
secret on the ground that revealing them would be “detrimental to the national
security”); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2274 (2000) (prohibiting disclosure of
certain data concerning nuclear weapons); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 486 F.
Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis.) (enjoining the publication of an article on the false premise that it
contained information on how a hydrogen bomb could be constructed), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND
SECURITY IN A POST 9/11 WORLD: A REPORT BASED ON REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS
BETWEEN THE SCIENCE AND SECURITY COMMUNITIES 58 (2007) (“Although the risk that
pathogens will be used for harm has been around for centuries, the emerging global,
fast-paced, and collaborative nature of the life sciences now makes protecting
information, personnel, and materials from abuse that much more difficult. To
effectively identify dual-use research of concern, and perhaps restrict it, techniques
must be available to determine what types of biological agents could stand as threats,
as well as what types of mathematics, software programs, physical materials, and
computational tools could enhance biological threats.”); Eugene Volokh, CrimeFacilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1222 (2005).
5 This method relies on

secrecy of design and implementation to achieve a feeling of security. A
system relying on security through obscurity may have serious security
vulnerabilities, while its owners and designers wish that simply by not
informing others of the flaws, no attacker will find them. This approach only
creates an illusion of security.
HARRI HURSTI, THE BLACK BOX REPORT: CRITICAL SECURITY ISSUES WITH DIEBOLD
OPTICAL SCAN DESIGN 2 (2005), http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9MV8-JPE8]. The attack on this method of security dates back to 1853 in
response to fears that publications regarding locks and safes would inspire a wave of
lock-picks. “Rogues are very keen in their profession, and know already much more
than we can teach them.” Tal Klein, The Tao of Responsible Disclosure, WIRED (Oct.
2014), https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/10/the-tao-of-responsible-disclosure/ [https://
perma.cc/4Q3A-57CB].
6 See infra Part III.
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researchers alike.7 Though these expansions have correctly
concerned consumers, researchers, and rights activists,8 the
fundamental tenet of the regime—secrecy enhances security—
stubbornly endures.
This article illuminates the archaic and harmful
secrecy-focused intellectual property approach and suggests a
new course in the face of evolving national threats. Part I sets
out the dire cyber-warfare climate. Part II explores the secrecy
approach evolving from the Invention Secrecy Act involving
patents during wartime to the Atomic Energy Act and antidecryption
export
controls.
Part III describes the
anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA that inadvertently
encourage a security through obscurity approach and serve to chill
much of the same research targeted by unconstitutional export
controls. Part IV proposes a security-strengthening “defense in
depth” approach based on responsible openness tenets to leverage
community research, improve network vitality, and combat cyberthreats. Part V addresses likely counterarguments and areas for
further research.
I.

GLOBAL CYBERATTACKS AND THE GROWING DEMAND FOR
SECURITY RESEARCH

The spate of cyberattacks against vital infrastructure—
electoral, nuclear, and medical—undertaken by foreign actors
signals the need for greater defense in an era of constant
electronic warfare. This Part details the most troubling of these
recent attacks: the Russian-led attacks on the United States’
2016 Presidential election, Russian intrusions in energy
sectors, and the (as-yet unsourced) Wannacry ransomware
attack on the international medical system.

See infra Section III.D.
While there are compelling arguments couched in constitutional principles
to do away with this provision, there has been a reluctance to examine the bedrock
behind this entire doctrine—does intellectual property secrecy serve to buttress
national security? The answer is clearly no. Moreover, a policy-based approach is
necessary, as courts have shown a frightening willingness to contort constitutional law
in the face of national security threats. See Andrew V. Moshirnia, Valuing Speech and
Open Source Intelligence in the Face of Judicial Deference, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 385,
411–14 (2013) (collecting wartime cases distorting First Amendment jurisprudence and
noting that the Court deliberately misapplied strict scrutiny in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 8 (2010)); see also infra Sections II.A–B (noting
judicially enforced speech suppression and speech compulsion in matters of national
security).
7
8
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Russian Electoral Cyberattacks

Recent Russian cyberattacks against American electoral
integrity have captured the public’s attention.9 The damage is
still being uncovered,10 but the coordinated effort involved at
least three distinct avenues of intrusion, targeting: (1) voting
machines; (2) the election systems of thirty-nine states; and (3)
individual accounts of election participants, including the
Democratic National Committee (DNC). The latter of these
attacks is well-known, while the former two have received far
less attention. The attribution of these attacks to Russia is
strengthened by a pattern of similar attacks conducted by
Russia against Ukraine.11 Former FBI Director James Comey
opined that the Russians are not done meddling: “They’re
coming after America. . . . [T]hey will be back.”12 The
coordinated attack on the foundation of American democracy

9 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, JAR-16-20296A, NCCIC JOINT ANALYSIS REPORT: GRIZZLY STEPPE—
RUSSIAN MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-20161229.pdf [https://perma.cc/689F-VM95] (detailing Russian interference in the 2016
presidential election). America is not the only country experiencing Russian electoral
meddling. See Oren Dorell, Russia Engineered Election Hacks and Meddling in Europe,
USA TODAY (Jan. 9, 2017, 8:01 AM ET), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/
2017/01/09/russia-engineered-election-hacks-europe/96216556/ [https://perma.cc/GY32J88G] (“Cyberattacks in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, France and Austria
that investigators attributed to suspected Russian hackers appeared aimed at
influencing election results, sowing discord and undermining faith in public
institutions that included government agencies.”).
10 Jessica Taylor, Source: Mueller Using D.C. Grand Jury in Russia Probe,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 3. 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/08/03/541432868/sourcemueller-using-d-c-grand-jury-in-russia-probe
[https://perma.cc/MV8D-MXRB]
(detailing Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s “investigation into Russian efforts to
influence the 2016 presidential election and into possible collusion between Russia and
top aides to the Trump campaign”).
11 See infra Section I.A.4.
12 163 CONG. REC. S3480 (daily ed. June 14, 2017) (statement of Sen.
Durbin),
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2017/6/14/senatesection/article/s3462-3 [https://perma.cc/GF3C-LPAX]; see also Full Text: James Comey
Testimony Transcript on Trump and Russia, POLITICO (June 8, 2017, 1:48 PM EDT),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/08/full-text-james-comey-trump-russia-testimony239295 [https://perma.cc/SZU3-82JR] (noting the bipartisan importance of a full
investigation into Russian electoral meddling: “It is not a Republican thing or a
democratic thing. It really is an American thing. They’re going to come for whatever
party they choose to try and work on behalf of, and they’re not devoted to either, in my
experience. They’re just about their own advantage. They will be back.”); Full
Transcript: FBI Director James Comey Testifies on Russian Interference in 2016 Election,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
20,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2017/03/20/full-transcript-fbi-director-james-comey-testifies-on-russianinterference-in-2016-election/?utm_term=.8b0123e11b37 [https://perma.cc/Z5Q2-CLG4].
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highlights the existential threat of such attacks and the
importance of improving cybersecurity.13
1. Voting Machines
Electronic voter machines have long been flagged as a
weak spot in electoral infrastructure,14 as they present security,15
logistical,16 and financial17 challenges. These difficulties are
13 Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned, “An
American citizen should be very concerned about a foreign government, particularly
our primary adversary, interfering with the most important foundational process that
we have in this country, which is free and fair elections.” Mallory Shelbourne, Clapper:
‘Aggressiveness’ of Russian Interference in Election ‘Unprecedented’, HILL (May 30,
2017,
8:22
AM
EDT),
http://thehill.com/homenews/news/335575-clapperaggressiveness-of-russian-interference-in-election-unprecedented
[https://perma.cc/T7RW-KCFA].
14 See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, The Problem with Electronic Voting Machines,
SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 10, 2004), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/
11/the_problem_wit.html [https://perma.cc/N2NW-YBN2] (collecting known voting
machine malfunctions, including: “Fairfax County, VA, in 2003, a programming error
in the electronic voting machines caused them to mysteriously subtract 100 votes from
one particular candidates’ totals. In San Bernardino County, CA in 2001, a
programming error caused the computer to look for votes in the wrong portion of the
ballot in 33 local elections, which meant that no votes registered on those ballots for
that election. A recount was done by hand. In Volusia County, FL in 2000, an electronic
voting machine gave Al Gore a final vote count of negative 16,022 votes. The 2003
election in Boone County, IA, had the electronic vote-counting equipment showing that
more than 140,000 votes had been cast in the Nov. 4 municipal elections. The county
has only 50,000 residents and less than half of them were eligible to vote in this
election.”);
HACKING
DEMOCRACY
(Home
Box
Office
2006),
http://www.hackingdemocracy.com/ [https://perma.cc/N7DF-G5EH] (Emmy-nominated
documentary of flawed security of Diebold Election Systems, including the famous
“Hursti Hack” in which Harri Hursti’s team successfully altered votes on a Diebold
voting machine); HURSTI, supra note 5.
15 Voting System Security and Reliability Risks, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
(2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Fact_Sheet_Voting_S
ystem_Security.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Z39-SP7V].
16 Lawrence Norden & Christopher Famighetti, America’s Voting Technology
Crisis, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/
09/americas-voting-technology-crisis/405262/ [https://perma.cc/6879-JY6K] (noting that
a large number of voting machines are at the end of their lifespan. “[F]or machines
purchased since 2000, the expected lifespan for the core components of electronic voting
machines is generally between [ten] and [fifteen] years. The majority of machines in
use in the United States are perilously close to or exceed these estimates. In [fortythree] states, the oldest machines will be at least [ten] years old next November. In
[fourteen] states they will be more than [fifteen] years old.”); Lauren Smiley, America’s
Voting Machines Are a Disaster in the Making, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 19, 2016), https://
newrepublic.com/article/137115/americas-voting-machines-disaster-making [https://
perma.cc/RDD3-QY8C] (noting that one expert “fears faulty machines more than
foreign hackers. A buggy voting machine, for example, could cause long lines at the
polls in a crucial swing state, or a faulty touch-screen could switch votes from Trump to
Clinton. And even if such glitches don’t affect the outcome of the election, a snafu or
two in traditional GOP strongholds will most definitely fuel the conspiracy theories”).
17 Congress initially financed the move to electronic voting machines as a
result of the difficulty of the 2000 Election recount. The passage of the Help America
Vote Act in 2002 set aside $4 billion to replace old punch card machines associated
with the “dimpled chad” debacle. See Jaeah Lee, Digital Voting Machines: Still
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heightened in the cases of voting machines that do not produce
a paper record that can be reviewed or audited, allowing an
intrusion or error to go undetected, absent a statistical audit.18
This problem is not limited to a few jurisdictions—fourteen
states use machines that produce no records, with five of those
states relying on “paperless electronic voting machines as their
primary polling place equipment statewide.”19 While there has
been coverage of voting machines’ technical issues across states
on election day,20 there has been comparatively little media
coverage of a greater calamity21: a Russian effort to infiltrate
machine manufacturers and potentially manipulate votes.22
According to a top-secret National Security Agency
(NSA) report:
FUBAR??,
MOTHER
JONES
(Nov.
6,
2012),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/digital-voting-machines-fail-hacked/
[https://perma.cc/UJX6-BY88]; Jessica Reeves, The Dimpled Chad Dilemma, TIME
(Nov.
21,
2000),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,89086,00.html
[https://perma.cc/7P8V-3JKN]. Whereas mechanical systems may be built to last decades,
electronic machines have a shorter lifespan. The amount of money needed to replace
obsolete voting machines is estimated to be $1 billion. Norden & Famighetti, supra note
16. Moreover, Congress has shown little inclination to help meet this challenge, as
voting machine purchases are typically treated as local issues. See Pam Fessler, Voting
Machines Are Aging, but Don’t Expect Congress to Pay to Replace Them, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Oct. 11, 2015, 11:46 AM ET), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/
2015/10/15/448931114/voting-machines-are-aging-but-dont-expect-congress-to-pay-toreplace-them [https://perma.cc/N89T-VBWU]; J.B. Wogan, Voting Technology Needs an
Upgrade, but Who Will Pay for It?, GOVERNING MAG. (Nov. 2016),
http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-voting-technology-machines.html [https://
perma.cc/VZ4H-NV33].
18 See AJ Vicens, Trump Says the Election Will Be Rigged. In These States, It
May Be Impossible to Prove Him Wrong, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 9, 2016, 4:59 PM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/08/millions-voters-could-cast-ballots-machinesleave-no-paper-trail/ [https://perma.cc/U279-VE9M] (noting that machines that leave no
paper trail are particularly vulnerable to hacking).
19 Voting System Security and Reliability Risks, supra note 15, at 2 n.3
(noting that “[i]n Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia, some portion of polling places use such paperless
machines as the primary equipment”).
20 See, e.g., Charlotte Alter, Detroit Voting Machine Failures Were Widespread
on Election Day, TIME (Dec. 14, 2016), http://time.com/4599886/detroit-voting-machinefailures-were-widespread-on-election-day/ [https://perma.cc/P8P9-MGQ8]; Mark Berman,
Sari Horwitz & William Wan, Voters Encounter Some Malfunctioning Machines, Other
Headaches on Election Day, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2016/11/08/election-day-voters-report-long-lines-intimidation-andconfusion-in-some-parts-of-the-country/ [https://perma.cc/76MU-XEKM].
21 This may be due in part to the Department of Homeland Security’s refusal
to fully investigate the matter. See Sam Thielman, The DHS Hasn’t Investigated
Whether Voting Machines Were Hacked in November, and Says It Doesn’t Intend To,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 30, 2017, 10:11 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/dhs-isrefusing-to-investigate-hack-of-voting-machines-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/UFK7-EEA8].
22 Nicole Perlroth, Michael Wines & Matthew Rosenberg, Russian Election
Hacking Efforts, Wider Than Previously Known, Draw Little Scrutiny, N. Y. TIMES
(Sept.
1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/us/politics/russia-electionhacking.html? [https://perma.cc/LP9V-ZKH2].
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Russian
General
Staff
Main
Intelligence
Directorate
actors . . . executed cyber espionage operations against a named U.S.
company in August 2016, evidently to obtain information on
elections-related software and hardware solutions. . . . The actors
likely used data obtained from that operation to . . . launch a voter
registration-themed spear-phishing campaign targeting U.S. local
government organizations.23

Spear-phishing
emails,
targeted
emails
delivering
compromising malware, were sent to seven employees of VR
Systems, an electronic voting services and equipment provider
for eight states.24 At least one of those potential victims
appears to have been compromised.25
Using the login credentials gathered from that initial
attack, hackers started a second phase of sending targeted
emails to local election officials under the guise of VR
Systems.26 These emails contained a Word document that
purported to be system documentation for VR’s product line,
but which actually was a piece of malware created to hijack the
target computer and force the download of a second malware
bundle. It is still unclear if this phase of the attack was
successful.27
While there is no evidence that Russian hackers sought
to reassign votes, such an attack is technically possible. Alex
Halderman, coincidentally one of the most prominent
researchers chilled in a frivolous DMCA action,28 noted: “So as
23 Matthew Cole, Richard Esposito, Sam Biddle & Ryan Grim, Top-Secret NSA
Report Details Russian Hacking Effort Days before 2016 Election, INTERCEPT (June 5, 2017,
3:44 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/06/05/top-secret-nsa-report-details-russian-hackingeffort-days-before-2016-election/ [https://perma.cc/H4CG-J5B4].
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Halderman discovered that an invasive Digital Rights Management (DRM)
program embedded in music CDs could be disabled simply by pressing down the shift
key when the disc was loading. His discovery caused the DRM manufacturer to
experience a twenty-five percent drop in stock price and precipitated a threat of suit
under the DMCA. See Katie Dean, Shift-Key Case Rouses DMCA Foes, WIRED (Oct. 11,
2003, 2:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2003/10/shift-key-case-rouses-dmca-foes/
[https://perma.cc/9ULT-AQC2]; see also Student Who Revealed CD Copying Secret
Could Be Sued, CNN (Oct. 13, 2003, 5:32 PM EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/
biztech/10/10/bmg.protection.reut/ [https://perma.cc/XW5E-NEEP]. The company
initially reveled in the power of the DMCA, stating, “This cat-and-mouse game that
hackers and others like to play with owners of digital property is over. No matter what
their credentials or rationale, it is wrong to use one’s knowledge and the cover of
academia to facilitate piracy and theft of digital property.”
SunnComm CEO Says Princeton Report Critical of its MediaMax CD Copy
Management Technology Contains Erroneous Assumptions and Conclusions, B USINESS
WIRE (Oct. 9, 2003, 1:38 PM EDT), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20031009005573/en/SunnComm-CEO-Princeton-Report-Critical-MediaMax-CD
[https://perma.cc/FJV8-GPKV]. The company backed down in the face of
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a remote attacker, I can target an election management
system, one of these ballot programming computers. If I can
infect it with malicious software, I can have that malicious
software spread to the individual machines on the memory
cards, and then change votes on Election Day.”29 This threat is
all too real, as Russian-aligned hackers have previously
attempted to change vote tallies in corrupted machines.30
2. State Election Offices
Russian hackers also targeted the election rolls,
successfully breaching systems in thirty-nine states. In Illinois,
cyber-intruders attempted to delete and alter voter data;
according to the general counsel for the Illinois Board of
Elections, in 2016 a contractor detected a breach.
The hackers had gained access to the state’s voter
database, which contained information such as names, dates of
birth, genders, driver’s licenses and partial Social Security
numbers of 15 million people, half of whom were active voters.
As many as 90,000 records were ultimately compromised.31
Russian attacks were widespread. “Thirty-seven states
reported finding traces of the hackers in various systems,
according to one of the people familiar with the probe. In two
others—Florida and California—those traces were found in
systems run by a private contractor managing critical election
systems.”32

widespread ridicule. See Lisa Napoli, Compressed Data; Shift Key Opens Door To CD
and
Criticism,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
13,
2003),
http://
www.nytimes.com/2003/10/13/business/compressed-data-shift-key-opens-door-to-cd-andcriticism.html [https://perma.cc/2DT6-FH3M] (noting that the company dropped the
threat of suit after receiving “three thousand e-mails”).
29 Pam Fessler, If Voting Machines Were Hacked, Would Anyone Know?,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(June
14,
2017,
5:00
AM
ET),
http://www.npr.org/2017/06/14/532824432/if-voting-machines-were-hacked-wouldanyone-know [https://perma.cc/7H3M-YDF3]; Cole et al., supra note 23. It should be
noted that the federal contractor that leaked the classified NSA report on this attack
was soon thereafter arrested and charged with removing classified material. David
Smith & Jon Swaine, Russian Agents Hacked US Voting System Manufacturer before
US
Election,
GUARDIAN
(June
5,
2017,
18:47
EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/05/russia-us-election-hack-voting-sy
stem-nsa-report [https://perma.cc/Q3S3-2KSP]. This may have distracted the public at
large from the content of the underlying report.
30 See infra Section I.A.4.
31 Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, Russian Cyber Hacks on U.S. Electoral
System Far Wider Than Previously Known, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017, 5:00 AM EDT),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-13/russian-breach-of-39-states-threatensfuture-u-s-elections [https://perma.cc/96T5-XRTX].
32 Id.
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Security researchers have noted that voter registration
databases “were never built with this kind of a threat in
mind.”33 Indeed, Georgia’s election system is so unguarded and
reliant on off-the-shelf software that “a savvy 15-year-old
hacker” could penetrate it.34 Moreover, the disruption of this
voter information on election day would be disastrous. “Dan
Wallach, a computer security scholar at Rice University who
recently testified in Congress about election system
vulnerabilities noted, ‘If I can destroy voting registration data,
it does not matter how good the rest of your system is. You will
have lines and a giant mess when people turn up to vote.’”35
This sort of attack is not far-fetched. There is strong
evidence that the Obama Administration feared that it might
come to pass in an effort “to undermine public faith in the U.S.
democratic process.”36 The Administration drafted a
contingency plan allowing for the deployment of
“armed. . . . law enforcement agents” if Russian hackers
succeeded in stopping voting.37 Moreover, the plan included a
three-day window to address “post-election cyber incidents”
such as false news stories disputing the results.38
3. Democratic National Committee
The Russian attack that gained the most media attention
was the coordinated effort to hack and leak internal emails
related to the DNC and Democratic presidential nominee Hillary
Clinton. While the investigation into possible collusion by U. S.
citizens is ongoing, the underlying hacking effort is fairly well
understood. The U.S. Intelligence Community concluded,
The General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) probably
began cyber operations aimed at the US election by March 2016.
[They] assess[ed] that the GRU operations resulted in the
compromise of the personal e-mail accounts of Democratic Party
33 Evan Halper, U.S. Elections Are an Easier Target for Russian Hackers
Than Once Thought, L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-napol-elections-hacking-2017-story.html [https://perma.cc/X6AY-KQTR].
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Massimo Calabresi, Exclusive: Read the Previously Undisclosed Plan to
Counter Russian Hacking on Election Day, TIME (July 20, 2017), http://time.com/
4865798/russia-hacking-election-day-obama-plan/ [https://perma.cc/VWA5-TZAC].
37 Id.
38 Id; see also Shimon Prokupecz, Pamela Brown & Evan Perez, Exclusive:
FBI Tracked ‘Fake News’ Believed to Be from Russia on Election Day, CNN (Aug. 4,
2017, 4:33 PM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/04/politics/election-day-cyber-threatfbi-monitoring/index.html [https://perma.cc/6RHE-XW6J] (“‘We were right on the edge of
Constitutional legality,’ a person briefed on the investigation said. ‘We were monitoring
news.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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officials and political figures. By May, the GRU had exfiltrated large
volumes of data from the DNC.39

Russian hacker Guccifer 2.0,40 potentially with the
assistance of GOP-connected go-betweens,41 sorted the materials
and selectively leaked them to Wikileaks, which then released the
information in batches to the press.42
4. Prior Election Cyberattacks by Russia
The intelligence community’s attribution of the attacks
to Russia is strengthened by Russia’s prior election
cyberattacks in Ukraine.43 In 201444 and again in 2015, the pro-

39 NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, ICA 2017-01D, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US
ELECTIONS 2 (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AZ2R-36MB].
40 AJ Vicens, DNC Hacker Dumps Trove of Clinton Documents: Guccifer 2.0
Strikes Again, MOTHER JONES (June 21, 2016, 7:24 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2016/06/hacker-releases-another-set-dnc-documents-hillary-clinton/ [https://
perma.cc/TKH9-3LHN]; Lorenzo Franceshi-Bicchierai, ‘Guccifer 2.0’ Is Likely a Russian
Government Attempt to Cover Up Its Own Hack, MOTHERBOARD (June 16, 2016, 1:35 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/wnxgwq/guccifer-20-is-likely-a-russian-governmentattempt-to-cover-up-their-own-hack [https://perma.cc/D4NX-SQJH].
41 Alexandra Berzon & Rob Barry, How Alleged Russian Hacker Teamed Up
with Florida GOP Operative, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2017, 11:33 PM ET), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-alleged-russian-hacker-teamed-up-with-florida-gop-operative-149
5724787 [https://perma.cc/88W6-PWQG].
42 See, e.g., Dylan Byers, Donna Brazile Out at CNN Amid Leaks to Clinton
Campaign, CNN MONEY (Oct. 31, 2016, 1:33 PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/31/
media/donna-brazile-cnn-resignation/ [https://perma.cc/ TDW8-7HD7].
43 It should be noted that Ukraine is not the only former Soviet state that has
experienced a wave of Russian cyberattacks. Estonia was the target of a two-week long
cyberattack. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country, WIRED (Aug.
21, 2007, 12:00 PM), https://archive.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_
estonia?currentPage=all [https://perma.cc/N87L-W3EL] (“All major commercial banks,
telcos, media outlets, and name servers—the phone books of the Internet—felt the
impact, and this affected the majority of the Estonian population. This was the first
time that a botnet threatened the national security of an entire nation.”); Scheherazade
Rehman, Estonia’s Lessons in Cyberwarfare, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 14, 2013,
3:34 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/01/14/estonia-showshow-to-build-a-defense-against-cyberwarfare (“Estonia shouted loudly from the roof
tops that they were being attacked, that an act of war had being [sic] committed by the
Russians, and called upon its allies to assist, but they had a hard time getting anyone
to believe that this was a ‘real war’ and not a cybernuisance. In the end no one came to
help the Estonians but what that alarm did do was to put global cyberattacks on the
warfare discussion table for . . . NATO.”). Bulgaria, a country that was once a member
of the Warsaw Pact, also experienced major cyberattacks on election day. See Bulgaria
Will Leave Warsaw Pact, President Declares, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 2, 1991), http://
articles.latimes.com/1991-02-02/news/mn-395_1_warsaw-pact [https://perma.cc/6YUY7N7L]; Gordon Corera, Bulgaria Warns of Russian Attempts to Divide Europe, BBC
(Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37867591 [https://perma.cc/
WGU9-CJV9] (noting a “denial of service attack—which tries to make websites
inaccessible—targeted the electoral commission, presidency and other government
institutions on the day of a referendum and local elections” that was considered “an attack
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Russian hacktivist group CyberBerkut launched a series of
distributed denial of service (DDoS) and other cyberattacks in an
attempt to disrupt and discredit Ukrainian elections.45 In May
2014, hackers infiltrated Ukraine’s Central Election Commission
(CEC) as a precursor to changing votes.46 A mere forty minutes
before results were to be announced on television, the Security
Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny or SBU)
discovered a virus and removed it from the CEC’s computers.47
If it had not been discovered and removed, the malicious software
would have portrayed ultra-nationalist Right Sector party leader
Dmytro Yarosh as the winner with 37 percent of the vote (instead of
the 1 percent he actually received) and Petro Poroshenko (the
actually [sic] winner with a majority of the vote) with just 29
percent, Ukraine officials told reporters the next morning. Curiously,
Russian Channel One aired a bulletin that evening declaring Mr.
Yarosh the victor with 37 percent of the vote over Mr. Poroshenko
with 29 percent.48

Russian efforts were not limited to targeted vote changing
and also included a campaign to hinder vote counting and
efficient result reporting. “[C]omputers of Ukraine’s national
election commission were hit with a major attack that deleted
backups, damaged hard drives, make [sic] software unusable and
changed routers settings.”49
In the wee hours of the morning after polls closed, as results flowed
in from Ukrainian election districts, Internet links feeding that data
to the vote tally system were hit with a barrage of fake data
packets—known as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. So
from about 1 to 3 a.m. on May 26, election results were blocked,
on the Bulgarian state and the Bulgarian democracy and [was] conducted with a high
probability from Russia”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton Destruction’
from Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Passcode/2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-avoided-wanton-destructionfrom-hackers-video [https://perma.cc/YUP5-Z4YW].
45 Margaret Coker & Paul Sonne, Ukraine: Cyberwar’s Hottest Front, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2015, 9:14 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-cyberwarshottest-front-1447121671 [https://perma.cc/Q4TV-RTP2].
46 Katya Gorchinskaya, Olga Rudenko & William Schreiber, Authorities:
Hackers Foiled in Bid to Rig Ukraine Presidential Election Results, KYIV POST (May
25, 2014, 7:47 PM), https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/may-25-presidentialelection/authorities-hackers-foiled-in-bid-to-rig-ukraine-presidential-election-results349288.html [https://perma.cc/49NW-A73G].
47 Clayton, supra note 44; Halya Coynash, Russian Fake Shows CEC
Claiming Right Sector Win, HUMAN RIGHTS IN UKRAINE (May 26, 2014), http://
khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1401060238 [https://perma.cc/PD2D-D5V9].
48 Clayton, supra note 44.
49 Elizabeth Weise, ‘Getting Twitchy’: Election Threats Have Cyber Experts
Worried, USA TODAY (Nov. 5, 2016, 2:09 PM ET), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
news/2016/11/04/cyber-threats-election-2016-russia-clinton-trump-ukraine-hack-ddos-d
yn-denial-of-service-attack/93249646/ [https://perma.cc/VE9L-Y8D4].

1290

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:4

delaying the finally [sic] tally until the early morning, a preliminary
report by international election observers recounted.50

Russian efforts focused on elections and demonstrate the
danger posed by insufficient security.
B.

Russian Cyberattacks on Energy Infrastructure

Intrusions in the electric grid are also cause for
alarm.
In May 2017, Russian hackers infiltrated the
business systems of U.S. nuclear power plants and other
companies in the energy sector in an effort to gather
personnel data.52 This data could be used for more targeted
attempts to compromise infrastructure, including gathering
emails, communications about designs, security audits, poorly
secured passwords, and known issues.53 Additionally, hacking
groups can use compromised inboxes to send false emails
delivering malware to segregated systems.54 According to Greg
51

Clayton, supra note 44.
Hackers have repeatedly targeted the Department of Energy. Between
2010 and 2014, “hackers targeted DOE networks 1,131 times over the four-year span,
successfully cracking the network 159 times.” Corey Bennett, Energy Dept. Hacked 150
Times in 4 Years, HILL (Sept. 9, 2015, 5:09 EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/
253130-hackers-cracked-energy-department-150-times-over-four-years [https://perma.cc/
SJ34-RM6A]. Investigations into breaches found a number of troubling practices, including:
50

51

[p]ermitting systems to operate even though they were known to have critical
and/or high risk security vulnerabilities. The Department had not taken
appropriate action to remediate known vulnerabilities on its systems either
through patching, system enhancements or upgrades. [The Department]
fail[ed] to assign the appropriate level of urgency to replacing end-of-life
systems.
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. OFF. OF AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS,
DOE/IG-0900, SPECIAL REPORT: THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S JULY 2013 CYBER
SECURITY BREACH 2 (2013), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/12/f5/IG-0900.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5XCH-KH6A].
52 See Nash Jenkins, Feds: Russian Hackers Are Attacking U.S. Power Plants,
TIME (Mar. 16, 2018), http://time.com/5202774/russia-hacking-dhs-report-power/
[https://perma.cc/W729-8N9Z]; Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Are Targeting Nuclear Facilities,
Homeland Security Dept. and F.B.I. Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/technology/nuclear-plant-hack-report.html [https://
perma.cc/4RGH-BA5N].
53 Sonam Sheth, Hackers Breached a US Nuclear Power Plant’s Network,
and It Could Be a ‘Big Danger’, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 29, 2017, 9:36 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/nuclear-power-plant-breached-cyberattack-2017-6
[https://perma.cc/P3HZ-MWYB].
54 Elisabeth Leamy & Sally Hawkins, ‘Stranded Traveler’ Scam Hacks
Victims’ Emails, Asks Their Contacts for Money, ABC NEWS (July 13, 2012), http://
abcnews.go.com/Technology/stranded-traveler-scam-hacks-victims-emails-askscontacts/story?id=16774896 [https://perma.cc/R7R5-UUB4]; Steve Ragan, FTC Spam
Campaign Snares Thousands of Targeted Victims, CSO DASHBOARD (Dec. 7, 2016, 2:37
PM PT), http://www.csoonline.com/article/3148148/security/ftc-spam-campaign-snaresthousands-of-targeted-victims.html [https://perma.cc/JER5-YZ67] (noting heightened
danger of targeted spam that appears to be sent from a trusted sender).

2018]

NO SECURITY THROUGH OBSCURITY

1291

Martin, an expert with cybersecurity firm Jask, information
gathered in this fashion “can be used [by hackers] to set up for
future, more damaging attacks just based on the proprietary
information they’re able to steal.”55 While the attack did not
appear to compromise plant software, the specter of Russian
interference in the energy sector has become all too
familiar.56
Successful Russian targeting of electric systems has been
previously documented. In December 2015, Russian hackers
crippled Ukraine’s electric grid.57 On December 23, 2015, the
computer systems of regional electricity distributor Kyivoblenegro
were infiltrated, impacting the supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) system of the company.58 The primary
attack hijacked SCADA in an effort to open breakers, while
coordinated telephone floods jammed customer support lines.59
At the same time, workstations and internal servers were
wiped to delay restoration efforts.60 In turn, thirty substations
were brought off-line for three hours.61 This outage, coupled with
three other attacks in quick succession on different electric
distribution companies, resulted in approximately 225,000 people
losing power for several hours. 62
Shortly following the attack, the Ukrainian government
claimed that Russian security services were responsible.63
Indeed, Russian hacking groups have been outspoken in their
support of the Russian occupation of Crimea.64 This attribution
Sheth, supra note 53.
See James Conca, Is Hacking Nuclear Power Plants Something We Should
Be Afraid Of?, FORBES (July 7, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/
2017/07/07/is-hacking-nuclear-power-plants-something-we-should-be-afraid-of/#6e808815
dde8 [https://perma.cc/8NSZ-KNVL] (arguing that the threat of hacking a nuclear plant is
low but that the hacking of the energy grid is of much greater concern).
57 ELECTRONIC INFO. SHARING & ANALYSIS CTR., ANALYSIS OF THE CYBER
ATTACK ON THE UKRAINIAN POWER GRID 1 (Mar. 18, 2016) [hereinafter E-ISAC Report],
http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/34FY-LYU7]; Jim Finkle, U.S. Firm Blames Russian
‘Sandworm’ Hackers for Ukraine Outage, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2016, 7:20 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-sandworm-idUSKBN0U
M00N20160108 [https://perma.cc/8UWA-AGLL]; Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning,
Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-powergrid/ [https://perma.cc/89AC-CVK4].
58 E-ISAC Report, supra note 57, at 1.
59 Id. at 13.
60 Id. at 11, 12.
61 Id. at 1.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 The year after targeting Ukraine, CyberBerkut launched similar attacks
against German websites, urging “all people and government of Germany [sic] to stop
financial and political support of criminal regime in Kiev, which unleashed a bloody
55

56
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is credible, especially in light of previous Russian-linked
cyberattacks on Ukrainian targets and subsequent attacks on
the Ukrainian energy grid.65
Almost a year later, Kiev again went dark.66 This time,
the attack centered on a transmission facility rather than a
distribution facility, and it coincided with attacks on the
Ministry of Finance, the Pension Fund, and the Treasury.67
Again, the malware responsible was attributed to Russia,68
which was likely using Ukraine as a testing ground for powergrid cyberweapons.69 Ukraine has continued to be attacked
with novel malware, shutting down airports, factories, and
banks.70 The latest attack received greater Western media
attention, as it factored into reduced earnings of numerous
civil war. We are CyberBerkut! We will not forget! We will not forgive!” Dennis Lynch,
Pro-Russian Hacker Group CyberBerkut Claims Attack on German Government
Websites, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015, 9:10 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/prorussian-hacker-group-cyberberkut-claims-attack-german-government-websites1775874 [https://perma.cc/623V-8XPC] (quoting CyberBerkut Has Blocked German
Chancellor and the Bundestag’s Websites, CYBER BERKUT, http://www.cyber-berkut.ru/
en/index_02.php [https://perma.cc/4GES-SRCQ]).
65 Russia Behind Cyber-Attack, Says Ukraine’s Security Service, BBC NEWS (July
2, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40471310 [https://perma.cc/ER9D-C6AW].
66 Andy Greenberg, ‘Crash Override’: The Malware That Took Down a Power
Grid, WIRED (June 12, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/crash-overridemalware [https://perma.cc/AHX2-R45U].
67 Education Ministry Website Is Under DdoS-Attacks, 112.UA INFO. AGENCY
(Dec. 26, 2016 2:12 PM), http://112.international/society/education-ministry-websiteis-under-ddos-attacks-12465.html
[https://perma.cc/N88Z-PSBD];
Vsevolod
Nekrasov, Ukraine Is Losing a Cyberwar: Hackers Attacked Public Treasury, 112.UA
INFO. AGENCY (Dec. 12, 2016 2:30 PM), http://112.international/article/ukraine-islosing-a-cyberwar-hackers-attacked-public-treasury-11957.html
[https://perma.cc/5MCN-LWWL].
68 Joe Uchill, Researchers Break Down Malware Likely Used in Ukraine
Blackout, HILL (June 12, 2017, 11:09 AM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/
337404-researchers-break-down-malware-likely-used-in-ukraine-blackout [https://perma
.cc/K78N-6MXJ]; Ukraine Power Cut ‘Was Cyber-Attack’, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-38573074 [https://perma.cc/B3DA-YYKL].
69 Experts Suspect Russia Is Using Ukraine as a Cyberwar Testing Ground,
NPR (June 22, 2017, 1:14 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/2017/06/22/533951389/expertssuspect-russia-is-using-ukraine-as-a-cyberwar-testing-ground [https://perma.cc/58ZUULNX]; Deborah Haynes, Russia Has Edge over Us in Battle, Army Admits, TIMES
(London) (Aug. 10, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/russiahas-edge-over-us-in-battle-army-admits-tsl7j63f5 [http://perma.cc/BV6L-47Q3].
70 Lizzie Dearden, Ukraine Cyber Attack: Chaos as National Bank, State
Power Provider and Airport Hit by Hackers, INDEPENDENT (June 27, 2017, 1:04 BST),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-cyber-attack-hackersnational-bank-state-power-company-airport-rozenko-pavlo-cabinet-a7810471.html
[https://perma.cc/SL6A-JBGV]; Nolan Peterson, Whose Cyberattack Brought Ukraine to
a Shuddering Halt?, NEWSWEEK (July 1, 2017, 12:20 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/
nolan-peterson-whose-cyberattack-brought-ukraine-shuddering-halt-630500 [https://
perma.cc/3LW7-M4WC]; Pavel Polityuk & Alessandra Prentice, Ukrainian Banks,
Electricity Firm Hit by Fresh Cyber Attack, REUTERS (June 27, 2017, 8:26 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cyber-attacks-idUSKBN19I1IJ [https://
perma.cc/H4JN-G8GT].
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multinational firms.71 The main attack used a modified Petya72
ransomware73 variant, itself an offshoot of a leaked NSA exploit74:
EternalBlue.75 Security experts have warned that this sort of
attack is likely being readied as a threat against NATO members,
including the United States.76
C.

Chinese or North Korean WannaCry Cyberattack on
Hospitals

Russia is not the only state actor responsible for wideranging cyberattacks. On May 12, 2017, the Chinese77 or North
71 Jim Finkle & Eric Auchard, Corporate Profits to Take More Hits from
Ukraine Cyber Attack, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscyber-results-idUSKBN1AI2CQ [https://perma.cc/PFG8-VF88] (noting that Cadbury
chocolate and FedEx reported material financial damage due to the “worm”).
72 Olivia Solon & Alex Hern, ‘Petya’ Ransomware Attack: What Is It and How
Can It Be Stopped?, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2017, 2:17 EDT), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2017/jun/27/petya-ransomware-cyber-attack-who-what-why-how
[https://perma.cc/JJ9M-M2VZ].
73 Petya is considered “the next step in ransomware evolution.” Aliaksandr
Trafimchuk, Decrypting the Petya Ransomware, CHECKPOINT BLOG (Apr. 11, 2016),
https://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/04/11/decrypting-the-petya-ransomware/
[https://perma.cc/5YBM-AMQL].
74 For
clarity, a “vulnerability” is a flaw in a security measure.
Vulnerabilities may be artifacts of software, hardware or the structure of a system, but
may also be linked to behavioral or social patterns. Known software vulnerabilities are
collected in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) catalog. The hope is that
when a vulnerability is communicated to a vendor, the vendor will apply a patch to
remove the flaw. An “exploit” is a term

commonly used to describe a software program that has been developed to
attack an asset by taking advantage of a vulnerability. The objective of many
exploits is to gain control over an asset. For example, a successful exploit of a
database vulnerability can provide an attacker with the means to collect or
exfiltrate all the records from that database. The successful use of exploits of
this kind is called a data breach. Exploits are also developed to attack an
operating system or application vulnerability to gain remote administrative
or “run” privileges on a laptop or server.
Dave Piscitello, Threats, Vulnerabilities and Exploits—Oh My!, ICANN: BLOG (Aug. 10,
2015), https://www.icann.org/news/blog/threats-vulnerabilities-and-exploits-oh-my
[https://perma.cc/9DL3-PQ4E]. In this case, a vulnerability denoted as CVE-2017-0144
was found in Microsoft Windows. The NSA developed an exploit of that vulnerability.
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010-Critical: Security Update for Microsoft Windows
SMB Server (4013389), MICROSOFT (Mar. 14, 2017), https://docs.microsoft.com/enus/security-updates/securitybulletins/2017/ms17-010 [https://perma.cc/4BE6-YHEH];
Matt Burgess, Everything You Need to Know About EternalBlue—The NSA Exploit
Linked to Petya, WIRED (June 28, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-eternalblue-exploit-vulnerability-patch [https://perma.cc/2ZEJ-JA8L].
75 Tod Beardsley, Petya-Like Ransomware Explained, RAPID7: BLOG (June 27,
2017), https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2017/06/27/petya-ransomwareexplained [https://perma.cc/6SRX-5W5J].
76 Andy Greenberg, How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for
Cyberwar, WIRED (June 20, 2017, 06:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/russianhackers-attack-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/28KC-Y5QR].
77 WannaCry Ransom Notice Analysis Suggests Chinese Link, BBC NEWS
(May 29, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40085241 [https://perma.cc/532Y-
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Korean78 WannaCry ransomware infected roughly a quarter of
a million machines in 150 countries79 through an exploit of
Window’s Server Message Block, EternalBlue.80 The exploit is
believed to have originally been created by the NSA, and was
leaked to the public by the hacking group, The Shadow
Brokers.81
The attack infected medical devices and took down
entire radiology departments.82 The malware encrypted the
contents of devices and demanded payment for decryption.
Numerous device manufacturers released critical warnings
about the spread of the virus, instructing hospitals to unplug
vulnerable machines.83 Of note was the attack’s infiltration of
CJ3Q] But see Danny Palmer, China on WannaCry: It Wasn’t Us, Honest, ZDNET (Jun
13, 2017 10:39 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/article/china-on-wannacry-it-wasnt-ushonest/ [https://perma.cc/XV2R-7WC4] (noting that some firms attribute the attack to the
Lazarus Group, a hacking group linked to North Korea).
78 Gordon Corera, NHS Cyber-Attack Was ‘Launched from North Korea’, BBC
NEWS (June 16, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40297493 [https://
perma.cc/7LN3-8L4Z]; Cara McGoogan, WannaCry Cyber Hackers Linked to China Not
North Korea, Experts Say, TELEGRAPH (May 30, 2017 11:16 AM), http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/technology/2017/05/30/wannacry-linked-chinese-hackers-not-north-korea-expertssay/ [https://perma.cc/ZVQ6-2VYD].
79 Bill Chappell, WannaCry Ransomware: What We Know Monday, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (May 15, 2017, 2:31 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/
05/15/528451534/wannacry-ransomware-what-we-know-monday [https://perma.cc/BQZ76N5D]; Elizabeth Dwoskin and Karla Adam, More Than 150 Countries Affected by
Massive Cyberattack, Europol Says, WASH. POST (May 14, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/business/economy/more-than-150-countries-affected-by-massive-cyberattack-eur
opol-says/2017/05/14/5091465e-3899-11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html?utm_term=.adb
6e94ca674 [https://perma.cc/5VL2-ASUS]. For a larger analysis of the infection rates of
Petya and WannaCry, see DICK O’BRIEN, SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT
REPORT: RANSOMWARE 2017 AN ISTR SPECIAL REPORT (July 2017), https://www.
symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-ransomware2017-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NEM-GZCP].
80 Burgess, supra note 74.
81 Brad Smith, The Need for Urgent Collective Action to Keep People Safe
Online: Lessons from Last Week’s Cyberattack, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (May 14,
2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14/need-urgent-collectiveaction-keep-people-safe-online-lessons-last-weeks-cyberattack/#sm.0000mpb068eg
gcqczh61fx32wtiui [https://perma.cc/T2PY-Y7HH]; see also April Glaser, U.S.
Hospitals Have Been Hit by The Global Ransomware Attack, RECODE (June 27, 2017,
6:47 PM EDT), https://www.recode.net/2017/6/27/15881666/global-eu-cyber-attack-ushackers-nsa-hospitals [https://perma.cc/7C2H-93CR].
82 Thomas Fox-Brewster, Medical Devices Hit by Ransomware for the First
Time
in
US
Hospitals,
FORBES
(May
17,
2017,
9:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/05/17/wannacry-ransomware-hitreal-medical-devices/#7d6b880425cf [https://perma.cc/NX97-U8FX].
83 See, e.g., Committed to Proactively Addressing the Security Concerns of Our
Customers, PHILIPS HEALTHCARE, https://www.usa.philips.com/healthcare/about/
customer-support/product-security
[https://perma.cc/R5QK-Z4AC];
Customer
Information on WannaCry Malware for Siemens Healthineers Imaging and Diagnostics
Products, SIEMENS PRODUCTCERT (May 16, 2017), https://www.siemens.com/cert/
pool/cert/siemens_security_bulletin_ssb-421479.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7YL-FGRJ]; GE
Healthcare Guidance on WannaCry Ransomware, GE HEALTHCARE, http://
www3.gehealthcare.com.sg/en-gb/support/security
[https://perma.cc/758U-
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the U.K.’s National Health Service, impacting roughly twenty
percent of hospital-managing trusts, and even reaching several
U.S. hospitals, which have continued to feel the effects of the
attack even after initial patching.84 The attack did not focus on
the medical sector alone,85 infecting Spanish telecoms, gas, and
electric companies. The success of WannaCry also inspired
similar attacks linked to the same vulnerability; indeed, Petya
and NotPetya ransomware continue to impact U.S. hospitals.86
The initial WannaCry infection could have been much
worse, but for the discovery of a “kill switch” by an altruistic
third party—Marcus Hutchins.87 Hutchins, a twenty-two year
old security researcher, noted that the malware’s propagation
mechanism referenced an unregistered domain.88 The worm
would attempt to connect to the domain and upon that ping’s
failure, the worm’s behavior would remain unchanged.89 By
registering the domain, Hutchins was able to disable the worm
and stop the global spread.90 Hutchins subsequently donated to
charity his $10,000 reward for helping stop the attack.91
2MG2]; Information Technology Advisory—“WannaCry” Ransomware, BAYER IN
RADIOLOGY
(May
17,
2017),
https://
www.radiologysolutions.bayer.com/service/information-technology-advisory/
[https://perma.cc/XL3E-2BBK] (“Bayer is aware of ransomware (‘WannaCry’) that is
exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft (MS) Windows. If a hospital’s network is
compromised by the malware attack, the virus can spread through the hospital’s
information technology (IT) network. In this event, Bayer’s Windows-based devices
that are connected to the network may be impacted.”).
84 Heather Landi, HHS Notice: WannaCry Malware Continues to Impact U.S.
Healthcare Orgs, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (June 6, 2017), https://www.healthcareinformatics.com/news-item/cybersecurity/hhs-notice-wannacry-malware-continuesimpact-us-healthcare-orgs [https://perma.cc/3NPQ-5X33] (“The virus can persist even
on a machine that has been patched, however, the virus will not spread to a patched
machine, but the attempt to scan can disrupt Windows operating systems when it
executes. The particular effect varies according to the version of Windows on the
device, HHS stated.”).
85 Corera, supra note 78 (noting the “attack was indiscriminate rather than
targeted”).
86 See Lily Hay Newman, Latest Ransomware Hackers Didn’t Make WannaCry’s
Mistakes, WIRED (June 27, 2017, 7:23 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/petya-ransomwarewannacry-mistakes/ [https://perma.cc/QHA3-8HQE]; see also Glaser, supra note 81.
87 How to Accidentally Stop a Global Cyber Attacks, MALWARETECH (May 13, 2017),
https://www.malwaretech.com/2017/05/how-to-accidentally-stop-a-global-cyber-attacks.html
[https://perma.cc/424V-DK6Q]; Newman, supra note 86.
88 Marcus Hutchins ‘Saved the U.S.’ from WannaCry Cyberattack on
Bedroom Computer, NBC NEWS (May 16, 2017, 8:18 AM ET), https://www.nbcnews.
com/storyline/hacking-of-america/marcus-hutchins-saved-u-s-wannacry-cyberattackbedroom-compter-n759931 [https://perma.cc/8QWR-GNZK].
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Rob Price, The 22-Year-Old Brit Who Stopped the Global Cyberattack Is
Donating His $10,000 Reward to Charity, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 16, 2017, 5:47 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/malwaretech-donate-10000-wannacry-reward-charityransomware-2017-5 [https://perma.cc/D4AH-RSFM]. It should be noted that Hutchins
was subsequently arrested in the United States on charges related to other malware.
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IP SECRECY DOCTRINES ENABLE A SECURITY THROUGH
OBSCURITY APPROACH

The current relationship between intellectual property
(IP) and national security is founded on the belief that secrecy
of the former will strengthen the latter. One challenge to
overcome when discussing the role of intellectual property in
the national security context is the meretricious argument that
“loose lips . . . sink ships.”92 This approach is an outgrowth of
the Invention Secrecy Act during the world wars and the
subsequent Atomic Energy Act, with a sustained urgency
beginning during the Cold War and continuing through the
War on Terror. These laws, in turn, informed American export
control laws, which demonstrated a clear enmity to encryption
in particular.
This Part traces the development of the security
through obscurity IP doctrine embodied by the Invention
Secrecy Act and export controls. Both demonstrate a clear
suspicion of disseminating decryption information. While the
DMCA does not spring from the same concerns as the security
through obscurity doctrine, it achieves many of the same
outcomes: chilling the publication of potentially sensitive
findings and delimiting public availability of decryption
information. Recent attempts to expand secrecy to economically
valuable patents and to buttress the DMCA with stronger
export controls further highlight the links between the two
schools of thought.
A.

The Invention Secrecy Act and Atomic Energy Act

During World War I, the impact of technological
development on warfare was acutely evident, raising the fear
that “inventions which are of most use to the Government
during a time of war are also those which would, if known,
convey useful information to the enemy.”93 Congress passed
invention secrecy as part of the Trading with the Enemy Act of

Andy Greenberg, Hacker Who Stopped WannaCry Charged with Writing Banking
Malware, WIRED (Aug. 3, 2017, 3:40 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/wannacrymalwaretech-arrest/ [https://perma.cc/2GDJ-R79V].
92 Attila Nagy, The Best Operations Security Propaganda Posters from World
War II, GIZMODO (Aug. 27, 2015, 3:35 PM), http://gizmodo.com/the-best-operationssecurity-propaganda-posters-from-wo-1726361670 [https://perma.cc/5NRZ-XQPP] (collecting
multiple examples of WWII posters encouraging silence, including “Silence Means
Security”).
93 S. REP. NO. 65-119, at 1 (1917).
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1917 (TWEA),94 barring the publication of patents that could be
detrimental to the war effort.95 In doing so, the United States
followed the lead of other Allied states, including the British
and French.96 The TWEA may also be thought of as a key
development
in
American
wartime
export
control.
Unsurprisingly, patent suppression went unused during the
interbellum.97
The resumption of European conflict during World War
II prompted Congress to amend the TWEA in the Act of July 1,
1940.98 While the amended act initially had a two-year
window,99 which was necessary in light of the fact that the
United States had not actually joined the war, the TWEA was
later amended to remain effective for the duration of the war.100
The same year, Congress passed the Export Control Act (ECA),
granting the President the authority to bar the export of
munitions and aircraft supplies without a license.101
While the TWEA of 1917 and its amended form in 1940
contemplated only restrictions of IP in wartime or during
national emergencies, the advent of the Cold War caused a

94 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 95, 40 Stat. 394 (1917) (“[W]henever. . . . the
publication of an invention by the granting of a patent might, in the opinion of the
Commissioner of Patents, be detrimental to the public safety or defense or might assist
the enemy or endanger the successful prosecution of the war he may order that the
invention be kept secret and withhold the grant of a patent until the termination of the
war.”).
95 Of note is the approval of then acting secretary of the navy, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who would have opportunity to revisit this prohibition. S. REP. NO. 65-119,
at 3 (approval of Acting Secretary Roosevelt).
96 Id. at 2 (“[W]hen publication of the invention or design . . . might be
detrimental to the public safety or the defense of the realm or might otherwise assist
the enemy or endanger the successful prosecution of the war, [the Comptroller General
of Patents] may delay the acceptance of the complete specification.” (citing British
Order in Council of October 14, 1915 in Patent and Trade-Mark Review, Vol. XIV, 37);
see also id. (noting a French provision of law empowering the Minister of Commerce to
temporarily block patents that would endanger defense).
97 Indeed, the very text assumed suppression would lift at “the termination of
the war.” Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. at 394.
98 Act of July 1, 1940, ch. 501, 54 Stat. 710 (1940).
99 Id.; see also Sabing H. Lee, Protecting the Private Inventor Under the
Peacetime Provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 345, 349–50
(1997).
100 Act of June 16, 1942, ch. 415, 56 Stat. 370 (1942); see also Lee, supra note
99, at 350.
101 Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 508, 54 Stat. 712–14 (1940). President Roosevelt soon
thereafter prohibited the export of petroleum, lead, iron, and steel to Japan. See
Proclamation No. 2417, Signed by President Roosevelt, July 26, 1940, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, 3 Bull. 49 (July 27, 1940) reprinted in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JAPAN, 1931–1941, VOLUME II 216–17 (Joseph V. Fuller ed., U.S. Gov’t Printing Office
1943), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1931-41v02/pg_216 [https://
perma.cc/9XAQ-N43L].
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dramatic shift.102 The two great inventions of the Second World
War, the atomic bomb and the cracking of the German
encryption device Enigma,103 were perceived as vital national
resources that could not be disseminated.104 The Atomic Energy
Act (AEA) of 1946105 forbade patents useful only for nuclear
weapons and treated all nuclear information as “born secret,”106
meaning it was classified from its moment of inception
regardless of source.107 While this categorical approach may
have made some sense immediately following a world war,108
the demands for broader secrecy went much further. In 1951,
the Invention Secrecy Act (ISA) inaugurated the possibility of
never-ending IP suppression during peacetime; it “established a
102 Alexandra H. Katich, Note, Innovation Worth Sharing: Seeking Balance
Between Innovation Policy and National Security, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 418
(2015).
103 The cracking of German naval codes was a necessary step in winning the
Battle of the Atlantic, as evinced by enormous Allied losses during a period in which
Atlantic U-boats adopted Triton and the information stream went dark. See
Symposium, Ultra and the Battle of the Atlantic, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY DOC ID 3726627
at 6–7, 11 (Oct. 28, 1977), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassifieddocuments/cryptologic-spectrum/assets/files/Ultra.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3RC-Q423];
David DiSalvo, How Alan Turing Helped Win WWII and Was Thanked with Criminal
Prosecution
for
Being
Gay,
FORBES
(May
27,
2012,
3:06
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddisalvo/2012/05/27/how-alan-turing-helped-winwwii-and-was-thanked-with-criminal-prosecution-for-being-gay/#6a0975dd5cc3
[https://perma.cc/2U5L-38MZ].
104 NAT’L SEC. AGENCY & CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, VENONA: SOVIET
ESPIONAGE AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE 1939–1957 (1996), https://www.cia.gov/library/
center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-sovietespionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm [https://perma.cc/9CU24WMJ] (noting codebreaking efforts directed against the Soviet Union immediately after
the war); Oscar M. Ruebhausen & Robert B. von Mehren, The Atomic Energy Act and the
Private Production of Atomic Power, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1450 (1953).
105 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755, 768 (1946).
106 See generally Howard Morland, Born Secret, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401
(2005) (defining and lambasting the term).
107 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919, 924 (1954)
(Treating as restricted “[a]ll data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of
atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special
nuclear material in the production of energy.”).
108 It should be noted that this direction was not inevitable, however.
Famously, Graves thought that patent would be the ideal way to prevent the spread of
nuclear secrets. See Alex Wellerstein, Patenting the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Intellectual
Property, and Technological Control, 99 ISIS J. OF THE HIST. OF SCI. SOC’Y 57, 58-59
(2008), http://alexwellerstein.com/publications/wellerstein_patentingthebomb(isis).pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PPW-V2Y9] (“Captain Lavender explained that his office, on behalf of
the U.S. government, had filed patent applications for all aspects of bomb manufacture in
secret under the authority of the Commissioner of Patents because it had been feared
that private inventors might file speculative patent applications and believed that the
‘first-to-file’ status of the U.S. government would help in potential interference lawsuits.
Rather than answering the question of why the Manhattan Project had turned to the
patent system, Lavender’s answer begged it. The senators were skeptical. ‘I didn’t dream,
frankly, up until this point,’ McMahon said, addressing a fellow senator and committee
member, ‘that there was a patent application down there showing how the bomb was put
together. Did you?’ ‘No,’ the other senator replied. ‘Personally, I regret it.’”).
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prior restraint on government employees and . . . private
inventors.”109 The ISA limited secrecy orders to a year, but gave
the Commissioner the opportunity for constant renewals.110
The statutes have not been markedly revised since this
time,111 but there have been attempts to broaden the doctrine.
In 2012, the Federal Register solicited comments in light of a
congressional request to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) to determine “whether the currently performed
screening of patent applications for national security concerns
should be extended to protect economically significant patents
from discovery by foreign entities.”112 Nothing came of this
solicitation. The desire to expand113 and merge invention
secrecy, a limited wartime doctrine that has crossed into
perpetual application, and economically-motivated copyright
and trade secret doctrines, however, is quite obvious.114
The sensitivity of nuclear information has facilitated
judicially enforced prior restraint of speech. While prior
restraint is exceedingly rare, it appears to have been exercised
in both the context of the AEA and the DMCA.115 In 1950, the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) ordered Scientific American
magazine to destroy printed copies and stop publication of an
article by Hans Bethe116 concerning thermonuclear fusion.117

109 Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 275 (2005).
110 See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2012) (“An invention shall not be ordered kept secret
and the publication of the application or the grant of a patent withheld for a period of
more than one year. The Commissioner of Patents shall renew the order at the end
thereof, or at the end of any renewal period, for additional periods of one year . . . [if
the] national interest continues so to require.”).
111 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 softened restrictions on information related
to nuclear power as part of President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative. RICHARD
G. HEWLETT & JACK M. HOLL, ATOMS FOR PEACE AND WAR 1953–1961: EISENHOWER
AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 216 (University of California Press, 1989)
(discussing the Atoms for Peace initiative).
112 Katich, supra note 102, at 421.
113 Oddly, the ISA also become something of a right-wing meme when it was
implied that the Obama administration was using the doctrine to prevent the spread of
3D-printed firearms. See Danton Bryans, Comment, Unlocked and Loaded:
Government Censorship of 3D-Printed Firearms and a Proposal for More Reasonable
Regulation of 3D-Printed Goods, 90 IND. L.J. 901, 917 (2015) (noting that “some
advocate for the use of the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 (ISA) to control influxes of
new technology”).
114 See Notice of Request for Comments on the Feasibility of Placing
Economically Significant Patents Under a Secrecy Order and the Need to Review
Criteria Used in Determining Secrecy Orders Related to National Security, 77 Fed.
Reg. 23,662 (Apr. 20, 2012).
115 See supra Section II.A; see also infra Section III.A.
116 Manhattan Project Spotlight: Hans and Rose Bethe, ATOMIC HERITAGE
FOUND. (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.atomicheritage.org/article/manhattan-projectspotlight-hans-and-rose-bethe [https://perma.cc/9VFB-BA7N].
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Although scientists who read advance copies of the article
agreed it contained nothing that had not already been
published, the AEC insisted on heavily editing the article.118
The publisher noted that this prior restraint of “the nation’s
atomic scientists” indicated that the government was
“suppressing information which the American people need in
order to form intelligent judgments” on American nuclear
policy.119 Bethe did not wish to press the issue, however, and
the matter was never litigated.120
Almost thirty years later, in United States v.
Progressive, Inc.,121 the government sought an injunction to
stop Progressive from publishing an article by Howard Morland
titled, “The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We’re Telling
It,” which included drawings of a nuclear weapon.122 Morland, a
freelance author with no background in nuclear science, had in
large part taken the information for the article from an
encyclopedia entry.123 In granting the injunction under the
AEA, the court opined that “[w]hat is involved here is
information dealing with the most destructive weapon in the
history of mankind, information of sufficient destructive
potential to nullify the right to free speech and to endanger the
right to life itself.”124 The decision was widely condemned, with
the In These Times magazine writing, “The Government’s attempt
to prohibit publication . . . has less to do with anxiety over nuclear
proliferation than over the proliferation of legitimate information
about the nuclear weapons industry among the American
people.”125 The government later dropped the case as moot,126 thus
avoiding Supreme Court review.
117 Wendy Swanberg, The Forgotten Censorship of Scientific American in
1950, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (Aug. 6, 2008)
(unpublished conference paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Association
for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication), http://citation.allacademic.
com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/7/1/6/3/pages271636/p271636-1.php [https://
perma.cc/49DZ-L8PL].
118 Id.
119 HERBERT N. FOERSTAL, TOXIC MIX? A HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND POLITICS
13 (2010).
120 Id. at 12.
121 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 995 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
122 The original publication, far from a technical manual, looks like a general
interest magazine article. See The H-bomb Secret: How We Got It-Why We’re Telling It,
PROGRESSIVE (Nov. 1979), https://www.scribd.com/doc/80517266/The-Progressive-TheH-Bomb-Secret-How-We-Got-It-Why-We-re-Telling-It [https://perma.cc/H86J-8NAL].
123 FOERSTAL, supra note 119, at 13.
124 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 995.
125 FOERSTAL, supra note 119 at 14. The recent partial meltdown of the
nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island played heavily into coverage of government secret
keeping. See, e.g., Douglas E. Kisteeland, A.C.L.U. Will Represent Editors in Dispute
over
Article
on
Bomb,
N.
Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
6,
1979),
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Export Controls and the Anti-Encryption Movement

While invention secrecy serves as an ideological
foundation for the suppression of potentially dangerous IP, the
mechanism with the longest global reach is export control.
Modern export control springs from the same well as invention
secrecy, with wartime embargos of vital material evolving into
broad authority to restrict transmission of technical data. The
Export Control Act of 1949127 crafted broad authority for the
executive to restrict export licensing of technical data. The
Export Administration Act of 1969128 established the role of the
Department of Commerce to administer the Export
Administration Regulations for dual use technologies, while the
State Department regulated munitions, both of which make up
the Commerce Control List.
As noted above, cryptography technology was of
paramount concern resulting in cryptography techniques and
later, software, being classified as munitions.129 In barring the
dissemination of cryptography, the government retarded
development of strong crypto both abroad and at home.130 While
cryptography has never been banned for American citizens,
export controls historically barred the dissemination of any key

http://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/06/archives/aclu-will-represent-editors-in-disputeover-article-on-bomb-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/4S38-HKC7] (noting ACLU’s
statement: “This case is another illustration, like the Pentagon papers case and like
the recent Three Mile Island crisis, of the sound First Amendment principle that you
cannot trust the Government to decide what the public needs to know.”).
126 Free speech supporter and amateur researcher Charles Hansen had sent
letters to national newspapers repeating the basic information provided in the article.
Upon the publication of one of these letters in the Madison Press Connection, the
government concluded that the secret information had been released and dropped the
action. See Charles R. Babcock & Thomas O’Toole, H-Bomb Scientists Suspected of Leaks,
WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 1979), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/09/20/hbomb-scientists-suspected-of-leaks/7e9af3be-7ac2-4a31-aeb6-006fea554c84/?utm_term=.a84
0564e4c22 [https://perma.cc/DL66-B3MS].
127 Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 508, § 6, 54 Stat. 712, 714 (1940) (codified as
amended 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021–32 (1952)).
128 Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969).
129 In effect, encoding triggers were placed in the same category as nuclear
triggers. See Dan Froomkin, Deciphering Encryption, WASH. POST (May 8, 1998),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/encryption/encryption.htm [https://
perma.cc/D2T3-R7QC].
130 See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1146 (9th Cir.)
(“Viewed from this perspective, the government’s efforts to retard progress in
cryptography may implicate the Fourth Amendment, as well as the right to speak
anonymously, the right against compelled speech, and the right to informational
privacy.”) (internal citations omitted) en banc reh’g granted & opinion withdrawn, 192
F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
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over 40 bits.131 “[U]nder the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR), [the data encryption standard] had been
treated as something so dangerous that it could only be
exported with a license.”132 The National Research Council
undercut this approach in 1996 when it released its CRISIS
(Cryptography’s Role in Securing the Information Society)
report.133 President Clinton issued Executive Order 13206:
Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products, but
encryption controls would not be significantly relaxed until
2000.134
Of particular interest was the use of export controls to
prevent the publication of papers and source code for
encryption systems. In 1995, Daniel Bernstein, then a PhD
mathematics candidate, sought to publish an encryption
system, the source code for that system, and a paper describing
the algorithm at the core of the system he created.135 At the
time, export controls would have required Bernstein to register
as an arms dealer and submit his paper to the government for
prior review. Bernstein challenged these restrictions on First
Amendment grounds in federal court.136 In 1999, four years
after he sought to publish, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the code was in fact speech
and the export regulations were thus unconstitutional.137
131

A. Michael Froomkin, A Dispatch from the Crypto Wars, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y
MATT CURTIN, BRUTE FORCE: CRACKING

FOR INFO. SOC’Y 345, 357–58 (2006) (reviewing
THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (2005)).

Id. at 358.
See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY’S ROLE IN
SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996), https://www.nap.edu/read/5131/chapter/1
[https://perma.cc/KNB7-M2R4] (finding that the advantages of an encryption-based
information society far outweigh negatives associated with the spread of encryption).
134 See MICHAEL SCHWARTZBECK, THE EVOLUTION OF US GOVERNMENT
RESTRICTIONS ON USING AND EXPORTING ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES (Released by CIA
Sept. 10, 2014, original date of publication unknown), https://www.cia.gov/library/
readingroom/docs/DOC_0006231614.pdf [https://perma.cc/WU9R-K4T7]; New Encryption
Regulations Still “Overly Complex”, BIRMINGHAM BUS. J. (Jan. 24, 2000, 12:00 AM CST),
https://www.bizjournals.com/birmingham/stories/2000/01/24/story7.html
[https://
perma.cc/6ALX-JZJ2].
135 Alison Dame-Boyle, Remembering the Case that Established Code as Speech,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2015/04/remembering-case-established-code-speech [https://perma.cc/W9EN-YVX6].
136 See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1132–34 (9th Cir.),
en banc reh’g granted & opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
137 Id. The strange procedural history of Bernstein is worth noting as the
decision is not precedential. The government petitioned for and was granted rehearing
en banc, resulting in the withdrawal of the panel opinion. However, the en banc
rehearing never occurred as the government changed the regulations under judicial
review. In January 2000, the government amended export controls to allow for the
exemption of publicly available source code. See 15 C.F.R. § 740.13(e) (2000). Bernstein
argued that this still violated his First Amendment rights and amended his complaint.
However, the government successfully argued that as Bernstein had not been
132
133
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While cryptography export controls have been relaxed
significantly since 2000, the War on Terror has occasioned
government distaste for publicly available encryption tools and
spurred demands for mandated backdoors in encrypted
smartphones.138 The mass shooting in San Bernardino and the
resulting debate over encryption on iPhones placed the issue in
the public eye.139 When the FBI demanded that Apple author
software unlock the deceased shooter’s phone and obtained an
order to compel under the All Writs Act, it set up a dramatic
legal battle.140 This confrontation was avoided, however, when
the FBI paid more than $1.3 million to a third party for an
exploit.141 Predictably, law enforcement has also called for an
end to strong public encryption.142 Encryption researchers
threatened under the new regulations, he lacked standing; see also Junger v. Daley,
209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing trial court’s finding that encryption source code
is not speech protected by the First Amendment and remanding in light of
amendments to encryption export regulations); Cindy Cohn, Nine Epic Failures of
Regulating Cryptography, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Sept. 26,
2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/nine-epic-failures-regulatingcryptography [https://perma.cc/Q686-SBEZ].
138 See Greg Satell, The Debate Between the US Government and the Tech
Industry About Encryption, Explained, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/gregsatell/2016/01/09/the-debate-between-the-us-government-and-the-tech-indust
ry-about-encryption-explained/#7e3bb89b7141 [https://perma.cc/4AES-Z59Y].
139 Alina Selyukh, A Year After San Bernardino and Apple-FBI, Where Are We
on Encryption?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 3, 2016, 1:00 PM ET),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/12/03/504130977/a-year-after-sanbernardino-and-apple-fbi-where-are-we-on-encryption [https://perma.cc/4PUC-BQTU].
140 Amy Davidson Sorkin, The Dangerous All Writs Act Precedent in the Apple
Encryption Case, NEW YORKER (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/amydavidson/a-dangerous-all-writ-precedent-in-the-apple-case [https://perma.cc/Q36E-VA35];
see also Apple Challenges FBI: All Writs Act Order (CA), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
https://www.eff.org/cases/apple-challenges-fbi-all-writs-act-order [https://perma.cc/2HK2H8JP].
141 Julia Edwards, FBI Paid More than $1.3 Million to Break into San
Bernardino iPhone, REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2016, 2:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usapple-encryption-fbi-idUSKCN0XI2IB [https://perma.cc/K8NQ-8MSP]. There is a strong
argument that the government should release the vulnerability under its
Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP). Andrew Crocker, FBI Breaks into iPhone. We
Have Some Questions, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Mar. 28,
2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/fbi-breaks-iphone-and-we-have-somequestions [https://perma.cc/6AJD-5QF2]. However, in light of the government’s stated
desire for the creation of a backdoor (that is, a lingering vulnerability), this argument
seems fruitless. For more on the VEP, see Andrew Crocker, EFF Pries More Information on
Zero Days from the Government’s Grasp, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG
(Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/eff-pries-more-transparency-zerodays-governments-grasp [https://perma.cc/Y883-7BCB].
142 Cory Bennett, Law Enforcement Mobilizes Behind Encryption Bill, HILL
(Apr. 18, 2016, 1:18 PM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/276683-lawenforcement-mobilizes-behind-encryption-bill [https://perma.cc/9W4M-UE89]. Similar
calls seem to follow any coordinated attack. See, e.g., The Terrorist in the Data: How to
Balance Security with Privacy After the Paris Attacks, ECONOMIST: BRIEFINGS (Nov. 26,
2015), https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21679266-how-balance-security-privacyafter-paris-attacks-terrorist-data [https://perma.cc/KY8C-2JDU].
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resist such a change, however, arguing that such backdoors
will inherently increase complexity and reduce system
security.143
The interplay of Section 1201 of the DMCA and export
controls is intriguing because both purport to serve the
national interest by preventing the dissemination of hacking
tools. Indeed, in the most recent round of comments on Section
1201, commentators specifically compared these two judicial
levers, noting that a relaxed DMCA may be buttressed by more
targeted export restrictions.144 Beyond shared constitutional
objections regarding the silencing of speech,145 these two
approaches also trigger common policy questions as to the
impact of that enforced silence in the academic context. While
export restrictions arguably ceased chilling the publication of
encryption papers around 2000, the DMCA began chilling
similar research at nearly the same time.
III.

DMCA SECTION 1201 STIFLES RESEARCH AND
ENCOURAGES VENDOR SECRECY

The DMCA was famously passed to “update copyright
law for the digital age.”146 The DMCA introduced many
laudable protections for the development of Internet content,
but Section 1201 of the act introduced a novel threat to security
143 See
HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE LABORATORY TECHNICAL REPORT, KEYS UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING
INSECURITY BY REQUIRING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO ALL DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS 3
(2015), http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-026.pdf?
sequence=8 [https://perma.cc/42CW-5AP5]; BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y HARV.
UNIV., DON’T PANIC: MAKING PROGRESS IN THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 2 (2016),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_
Dark_Debate.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ7V-SPNT]; Jonathan Hauenschild, Encryption is Not
Preventing Law Enforcement from Investigating Crime, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL: PRIVACY
& SECURITY BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.alec.org/article/encryption-is-not-preventinglaw-enforcement-from-investigating-crime/ [https://perma.cc/JAH9-6X5B].
144 See Rebecca Tushnet, DMCA Hearings, Security Research, Opponents,
TUSHNET.COM (May 26, 2015), https://tushnet.com/2015/05/26/dmca-hearings-securityresearch-opponents/ [https://perma.cc/54DN-DSHC] (noting that administration
considered strengthening export controls as means to prevent information-sharing
agreements from strengthening enemies).
145 Had the court upheld an order forcing Apple to author code to break its
own encryption, this would represent yet another constitutional violation in the form of
compelled speech. See Kim Zetter, Apple May Use a First Amendment Defense in that
FBI Case. And It Just Might Work, WIRED (Apr. 25, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://
www.wired.com/2016/02/apple-may-use-first-amendment-defense-fbi-case-just-mightwork/ [https://perma.cc/94L6-Z5NJ].
146 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE
EDUCATION 2 (1999); see also Hillary A. Henderson, The Evolution of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: Changing Interpretations of the DMCA and Future
Implications for Digital Copyright Holders, 42 AIPLA Q.J. 245, 246–47 (noting purpose
of act was “to update copyright law for the digital age”).
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development. Although previous copyright law had regulated
uses of works in light of the property rights held by the rights
holder, Section 1201 sought to restrict user access to works.
Section 1201 of the DMCA, nominally a law concerned with
copyright, created an independent anticircumvention right,
with chilling effects squarely in line with previous wartime IP
doctrines. Due to the DMCA’s focus on stopping copyright
infringers from breaching access controls to pirate works,147 the
act has served to stymie security testing and encryption
research at the very moment those tasks are most critical. This
Section details the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA,
the case law interpreting those provisions, the failure of
exemptions to address researcher concerns, and the chilling
impact of the provisions.
A.

Section 1201: An Independent Anticircumvention Right

Section 1201 has three anticircumvention segments of
note. Section 1201(a)(1)(A) states that “No person shall
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title.”148 Section
1201(a)(2) prohibits trafficking in tools that enable
circumvention of access controls.149 And Section 1201(b)(1)
prohibits trafficking in tools that enable circumvention of

147 While the DMCA Section 1201 shares many features of the national
security-focused anti-encryption doctrine, the primary proponent of the section was the
motion picture industry. The Motion Picture Association of America had for years
pushed the agenda of resting liability on developers and traffickers of circumvention
technology, but industry efforts had been fruitless. The push to adopt
anticircumvention laws, well documented by Pamela Samuelson, first yielded Article
11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, requiring signatories to “provide adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective
technological measures” necessary to protect creative works. Pamela Samuelson, The
U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 414 n.261 (1997).

The impetus for this provision came largely from the U.S. motion picture
industry, which has for many years been keen on the idea of regulating
technologies that enable infringement. Although unsuccessful in previous
efforts to persuade Congress to pass a broad law to allow them to sue makers
of circumvention technologies, the motion picture industry saw in the Clinton
administration’s National Information Infrastructure (NII) intellectual
property initiative a new opportunity for getting the desired legislation.
Id. at 410. Although the obligations of Article 11 are modest, anticircumvention
proponents used these requirements to advance and pass the DMCA.
148 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012).
149 Id. § 1201(a)(2). Violation of either of these provisions creates a private
right of action for the rightsholder and, should the violation be for a commercial
purpose, criminal liability resulting in up to $1,000,000 in fines and ten years of
imprisonment. Id. §§ 1204(a), 1205.
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technological measures that protect the copyright owner’s
Section 106 rights.150
Though the DMCA’s anticircumvention provision is
commonly thought of in the context of copyright, the provision’s
scope is far broader. The relationship between Section
1201(a)(2)’s prohibition of circumvention tools that bypass
measures “effectively control[ing] access to a work”151 and
Section 1201(b)’s prohibition of circumvention tools that bypass
measures “effectively protect[ing] a right of the copyright
owner”152 has caused confusion as to whether Section 1201(a)
requires a nexus with infringement. The Federal Circuit
viewed Section 1201(a) through the limited lens of conventional
copyright infringement, while the Second and Ninth Circuits
crafted a new anticircumvention right.153
The Federal Circuit, in Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v.
Skylink Tech.’s, Inc.,154 attempted to narrow the reach of the
anti-trafficking provision, Section 1201(a)(2). The case involved
two manufacturers of universal garage door openers.155
Chamberlain marketed a higher-security rolling code opener
that would alter a remote signal to thwart burglars who were
detecting and recording valid remote signals.156 Skylink
released a system that was designed to work for both
traditional and rolling-code garage door openers.157
Chamberlain
sued,
alleging
that
Skylink’s
system
circumvented the protection mechanism embodied by
Chamberlain’s rolling code.158
The Federal Circuit affirmed the action’s dismissal.159 In
essence, the Chamberlain court determined that Section
Id. § 1201(b)(1).
Id. § 1201(a)(2).
152 Id. § 1201(b).
153 See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir.
2010); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Tech.’s, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1183, 1203 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2001).
While the Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a)–(c) (2012), has a narrow ban
on circumventing devices, it contains no express prohibition on the act of
circumvention. Similar acts are generally constrained to prohibited devices, including
cable service descramblers (so-called “black boxes”) in the Cable Communications
Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012) and satellite cable programming descramblers in
the Satellite Decryption Provisions of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)–
(4) (2012). Accord Protection of Encrypted Program-Carrying Satellite Signals, North
American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1707, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605,
613 (1993).
154 Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 381 F.3d at 1203.
155 Id. at 1183.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1184.
158 Id. at 1185.
159 Id. at 1204.
150

151
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1201(a) created a new cause of action linked to copyright
infringement, rather than a standalone (and entirely novel)
right of anticircumvention.160 Accordingly, Chamberlain could
not make out a Section 1201(a)(2) claim because
Chamberlain neither alleged copyright infringement nor
explained how the access provided by the [Skylink] transmitter
facilitates the infringement of any right that the Copyright Act
protects. There can therefore be no reasonable relationship
between the access that homeowners gain to Chamberlain’s
copyrighted software when using Skylink’s . . . transmitter and
the protections that the Copyright Act grants to
Chamberlain.161
Two other circuits have held, however, that Section
1201(a)(1)(A) applies to circumvention even when there is no
connection to copyright infringement. In Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley,162 the Second Circuit upheld an
injunction that barred posting code for or links to DeCSS, a
computer program that defeated a DVD encryption, Content
Scramble System (CSS).163 Notably, the case appeared to raise
fewer antitrust concerns than Chamberlain and Lexmark. In
Corley, the court noted that the DMCA was concerned with the
preservation of “digital walls” guarding protected material and
“does not concern itself with the use of those materials after
circumvention has occurred.”164
Similarly, in MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t,
Inc.,165 the Ninth Circuit considered the scope of Section
1201(a)(2) in relation to a bot maker.166 Blizzard is a video
160 Id. at 1195 (“Defendants who traffic in devices that circumvent access
controls in ways that facilitate infringement may be subject to liability under § 1201(a)(2).
Defendants who use such devices may be subject to liability under § 1201(a)(1) whether
they infringe or not. Because all defendants who traffic in devices that circumvent rights
controls necessarily facilitate infringement, they may be subject to liability under
§ 1201(b). Defendants who use such devices may be subject to liability for copyright
infringement. And finally, defendants whose circumvention devices do not facilitate
infringement are not subject to § 1201 liability.”).
161 Id. at 1204 (emphasis omitted); accord Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 552 (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., concurring) (noting that a
broader reading of 1201(a) in the context of printer ink cartridges “would ignore
the . . . main point of the DMCA—to prohibit the pirating of copyright-protected works such
as movies, music, and computer programs” and would present antitrust concerns).
162 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2001).
163 DeCSS was authored by Jon Johansen to allow DVD playback on
computers running Linux, which did not support licensed DVD players at that time. Id.
at 437.
164 Id. at 443.
165 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended on denial of reh’g, (Feb. 17,
2011).
166 In this context, a bot means an automated video game character that
would normally be controlled by a player. See Note, Spare the Mod: In Support of Total-
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game company with a popular massively-multiplayer online
role-playing game called World of Warcraft.167 MDY Industries
marketed a piece of software, “Gilder,” that automatically
played the game without user input, allowing game players’
characters to accrue experience even if game players were not
actively playing.168 Users complained about this cheat
mechanism, claiming it disrupted the game playing experience
for the wider community.169 In response, Blizzard banned the
use of the bot and designed Warden, a program to assess
whether a user connecting to a game server was using the
bot.170 In turn, MDY modified their bot to run only after
Warden had completed its assessment of the player’s random
access memory (RAM).171 MDY sought a declaration that Glider
did not violate Blizzard’s copyright rights.172 Blizzard brought
suit alleging numerous copyright violations, including a claim
that Glider circumvented the Warden software in violation of
Section 1201(a).173
A central issue on appeal concerned the nexus between
the anticircumvention right and infringement. That is, even if
Warden were considered an effective access control, the defeat
of Warden merely allowed game players to play a game—an act
that did not infringe on a right of Blizzard under the Copyright
Act. The court held that the plain text of Section 1201(a)
“creates a new anticircumvention right distinct from copyright
infringement” and thus reaches anticircumvention unrelated to
infringing uses.174
In sum, the case law does not provide a sufficient
judicial barrier on the application of Section 1201 outside the
context of clear copyright infringement. Due to the expansive
reach of Section 1201, additional importance falls on specific
exemptions. Unfortunately, these too are insufficient.

Conversion Modified Video Games, 125 HARV. L. REV. 789, 792 (2012) (examining bots
in online game communities).
167 MDY, 629 F.3d at 935.
168 Id. at 935–36.
169 Id. at 936. Complaints about bots in World of Warcraft are common. See, e.g.,
ToloDK, WoW PvP—Too many Bots in Battlegrounds!, YOUTUBE (Nov 26, 2012), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=HgWWSJwzEIU [https://perma.cc/67K3-DT5V].
170 MDY, 629 F.3d at 936.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 936–37.
173 Id. at 937.
174 Id. at 948.
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Statutory Research Exemptions Are Ineffective Due to
Narrowness and Lack of Certainty

The authors of the DMCA attempted to address the
inevitable deleterious effects that the anticircumvention right
would have on scholarly research and data security in two
ways. First, through permanent statutory exemptions and,
second, through temporary three-year exemptions adopted by
the Copyright Office. Neither of the proposed approaches is
satisfactory, however, due to either the vague nature of the
exemptions or due to their arbitrary impermanence.
The DMCA contains several exemptions so as not to
chill necessary research: Section 1201(f) provides an exemption
for reverse engineering,175 Section 1201(g) provides an
exemption for encryption research,176 and Section 1201(j)
provides an exemption for security testing.177 These
175

Specifically, the exemption provides that:

[A] person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer
program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of
identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary
to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program
with other programs, and that have not previously been readily available to
the person engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of
identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2012).
176 Specifically, the exemption provides that:
[I]t is not a violation of that subsection for a person to circumvent a
technological measure as applied to a copy, phonorecord, performance, or
display of a published work in the course of an act of good faith encryption
research if—
(A) the person lawfully obtained the encrypted copy, phonorecord,
performance, or display of the published work;
(B) such act is necessary to conduct such encryption research;
(C) the person made a good faith effort to obtain authorization before the
circumvention; and
(D) such act does not constitute infringement under this title or a violation of
applicable law other than this section, including section 1030 of title 18 and
those provisions of title 18 amended by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986.
Id. § 1201(g)(2).
177 Specifically, the exemption provides that:
[I]t is not a violation of that subsection for a person to engage in an act of
security testing, if such act does not constitute infringement under this title
or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including section 1030
of title 18 and those provisions of title 18 amended by the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1986.
Id. § 1201(j)(2).
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exemptions, however, rely on multifactor tests178 that provide
little certainty ex ante that researchers may be free from
frivolous suit. Moreover, Section 1201(j) provides little
protection in light of the fact that a researcher who exceeds
authorization—as may occur with a security researcher
because of restrictive licensing terms—would face liability
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).179
Section 1201(g) also required the Copyright Office to
generate a report about the impact of Section 1201 on
encryption research one year after the DMCA’s passage. This
report had a narrow window that captured very little of a longgestating academic research cycle, and was naturally based on
speculative comments on the potential effects of the DMCA on
178

Encryption research factors:

Factors in determining exemption—In determining whether a person
qualifies for the exemption under paragraph (2), the factors to be considered
shall include—
(A) whether the information derived from the encryption research was
disseminated, and if so, whether it was disseminated in a manner reasonably
calculated to advance the state of knowledge or development of encryption
technology, versus whether it was disseminated in a manner that facilitates
infringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than this
section, including a violation of privacy or breach of security;
(B) whether the person is engaged in a legitimate course of study, is
employed, or is appropriately trained or experienced, in the field of
encryption technology; and
(C) whether the person provides the copyright owner of the work to which the
technological measure is applied with notice of the findings and
documentation of the research, and the time when such notice is provided.
Id. § 1201(g)(3).
Security testing factors:
Factors in determining exemption—In determining whether a person qualifies for
the exemption under paragraph (2), the factors to be considered shall include—
(A) whether the information derived from the security testing was used solely
to promote the security of the owner or operator of such computer, computer
system or computer network, or shared directly with the developer of such
computer, computer system, or computer network; and
(B) whether the information derived from the security testing was used or
maintained in a manner that does not facilitate infringement under this title
or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including a violation of
privacy or breach of security.
Id. § 1201(j)(3).
179 See Erik Stallman, The Current DMCA Exemption Process Is a Computer
Security Vulnerability, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://cdt.org/
blog/the-current-dmca-exemption-process-is-a-computer-security-vulnerability/ [https://
perma.cc/3T2C-VKM7]; Charles S. Wood, Note, Cannibal Cop Out: Why Lenity Is a
Necessary, Yet Unworkable Solution in Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1849, 1852–59 (2017) (detailing the history and broadening of
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).
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both encryption development and research.180 As such, the
Copyright Office found that there had been no “current,
discernable impact on encryption research,” rendering
potential recommendations for alterations “premature.”181
The chilling effects resulting from the DMCA are not
some abstract or new concern. Rather, academics and ethical
hackers have constantly noted the impediment of Section 1201
on encryption and security research.182 From the earliest
rounds of rulemaking following the passage of the DMCA,
researchers have pleaded for broader protections in the face of
corporate threats.183 In 2000, the Copyright Office noted that
[a] number of commenters urged that a broader encryption research
exemption
is
needed
than
is
contained
in
section
1201(g). . . . Dissatisfaction was expressed with the restrictiveness of
the requirement to attempt to secure the copyright owner’s
permission before circumventing. Most of the references to statutory
deficiencies regarding encryption research, however, merely state
that the provisions are too narrow.184

The Copyright Office released another assessment of
Section 1201 in June 2017.185 The results show some
incremental progress in accepting the urgency of security
testing, but also demonstrate that the current statutory
exemptions are inadequate. The report had four key findings
with regard to Section 1201(j):186
a) The “authorization” requirement for Section 1201(j) is too
inflexible. Section 1201(j) currently “requires researchers to obtain
authorization of the owner or operator of [the relevant] computer,
computer system, or computer network.” This requirement has been
criticized as barring meaningful independent security testing if the
owner is unreachable or simply unwilling to grant authorization.

180 See generally Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519 (1999).
181 Joint Study of Section 1201(g) of The Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (May 2000), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca_
report.html [https://perma.cc/3YFL-SZ2Q].
182 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,571 (Oct. 27, 2000)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201); see infra Section III.D.
183 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,571; see infra Section
III.D.
184 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,571.
185 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 1201 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (June 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/1201/section1201-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P8Z-UUQ7].
186 Id. at 71–82.
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The report recommends this requirement be removed or made more
flexible by taking owner availability into account.187
b) The multifactor test for Section 1201(j) is too narrow.188 The
exemption requires that the results of the research be used “solely”
to promote the security of the computer owner. This requirement is
overly narrow because research could be undertaken to benefit the
general public. The report recommended this provision be
clarified.189
c) This exemption does not preclude compliance with other laws.
Though the exemption applies only in cases where no laws are
broken, including the CFAA, the report did not find this to be a
burdensome requirement. The report noted the issue could be
revisited at a later date.190
d) Applications for exemption renewal will be streamlined. While
exemptions granted through review are temporary and carry no
presumption of renewal, proponents of renewal may submit a shorter
application.191

The report is noteworthy for recognizing that
independent security researchers are a key component of
increased security. But the report achieves little, and merely
tinkers on the margins of unclear statutory exemptions and a
broken exemption process.192
C.

The Triennial Review Process Is Deeply Flawed

The exemption process of the DMCA is a famously
broken approach that aims to mildly weaken Section 1201’s
chilling effect on lawful activities. Once every three years, the
public may petition the Copyright Office for an exemption of
Section 1201(a)(1)’s restrictions as they relate to a specific class
of copyrighted works.193 For example, past petitions have asked

Id. at 76–77.
Id. at 77–79.
189 Id. at 77.
190 Id. at 79–80.
191 Id. at 140–47.
192 Mitch Stoltz, Copyright Office Proposes Modest Fixes to DMCA 1201,
Leaves Fundamental Flaws Untouched, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS
BLOG (June 28, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06/copyright-office-proposesmodest-fixes-dmca-1201-leaves-fundamental-flaws [https://perma.cc/VL8D-UACK].
193 The relevant statute provides:
187

188

In conducting such rulemaking, the Librarian shall examine—
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and
educational purposes;
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for the right to circumvent restrictions on a smartphone so that
it could join a wider variety of telecommunication networks (socalled “jailbreaking”).194 The Copyright Office makes
recommendations to the Library of Congress, which makes the
final determination of whether there can be an exemption on
the basis of whether “noninfringing uses by persons who are
users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be, adversely
affected” by the prohibition.195
The Copyright Office engages in a balancing test, which
effectively considers the rights of the copyright holder and
users of that work. The test illuminates the narrow focus of the
exemption process. National security concerns are not formally
part of the process, although it does appear that the office
occasionally mentions cyberthreats when prompted by
exemption opponents.196 In any event, the Copyright Office lacks
the expertise to weigh in on such matters, but even so, the
national security implications197 of proposed exemptions have
thrust the Copyright Office into roles for which it is severely
underqualified.
This
paradox
is
highlighted
in
inter-agency
communications urging the Copyright Office to restrict itself to

(iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological
measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research;
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or
value of copyrighted works; and
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012).
194 Timothy B. Lee, Jailbreaking Now Legal Under DMCA for Smartphones,
but Not Tablets, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 25, 2012, 6:45 PM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/10/jailbreaking-now-legal-under-dmca-for-smartphones-but-not-tablets/
[https://perma.cc/6GXV-LKT6] (noting that arbitrary rulings illustrate fundamental
brokenness of the DMCA).
195 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D) (2012).
196 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,944, 65,956 (Oct. 28, 2015)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (“[T]he Register concluded that the record did not support
the open-ended exemption urged by Class 25 proponents, encompassing all computer
programs on all systems and devices, including highly sensitive systems such as nuclear
power plants and air traffic control systems, and that the exemption should be limited to the
consumer-oriented uses that were the focus of proponents’ submissions.”).
197 See Comments of Comput. & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n & Open Source and
Indus. Alliance, In the Matter of Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, No. RM 2005-11 at 5,
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/schruers_ccia.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/8VNH-EHLE] (requesting exemption for works or compilations distributed in
formats protected by access control measures which threaten critical infrastructure
and potentially endanger lives).
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copyright matters. In a letter to the Copyright Office, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration
urge[d] the Copyright Office against interpreting the statute [section
1201(a)(1)(C)(v) allowing the Librarian to consider “other factors as the
Librarian considers appropriate”] in a way that would require it to
develop expertise in every area of policy that participants may cite on
the record. Although Congress clearly included this factor to enable
consideration of issues not otherwise enumerated, the deliberative
process should not deviate too far afield from copyright policy
concerns.198

The chief problem, as the Register of Copyrights noted
in 2010, is that “[n]o other agency has delegated authority to
temporarily limit the application of the prohibition on
circumvention.”199 The Copyright Office is fundamentally
unequipped to consider national security concerns, yet it is the
final say on exemptions that weigh directly on those
concerns.200
National security concerns were certainly not the main
driver of the adoption of the DMCA, but they have played a role
in perversely thwarting or narrowing exceptions to the DMCA.
The dual role of the DMCA, as both national security safeguard
and copyright protector, stems in part from our dual conception
of hackers as both cyber-terrorists and content thieves alike.
While the Copyright Office is charged with weighing the likely
benefits and harms to the rights holder and to non-infringing
users, opponents of exemption often frame arguments in terms
of security.
For example, in successfully seeking to narrow an
exemption relating solely to consumer products, the
Intellectual Property Owners Association raised the specter of
catastrophic public risk due to nuclear meltdown or train
derailment, noting that the exemption would reach
car components, supervisory control and data acquisition systems,
and other critical infrastructure, such as the computer code that
controls nuclear power plants, smartgrids, and industrial control
systems, internet-enabled consumer goods in the home, and transit

198 Opinion Letter on Sixth Triennial Section 1201 Rulemaking from U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Recommendations of the Nat’l
Telecomm. & Info. Admin. to the Register of Copyrights at 4 (Sept. 18, 2015), https://
copyright.gov/1201/2015/2015_NTIA_Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU64-3CRQ].
199 Id.
200 Id. at 4–5.
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systems. In view of the vast array of products that could be accessed
through the exemption, the public risk is impossible to quantify.201

Similarly, opposing an exemption for exploration of car
software, General Motors (GM) repeatedly mentioned
cybersecurity:
GM’s TPMs are strategically designed and implemented to protect
vehicle occupant safety (GM’s highest priority) and to maintain
mandatory emission protections, as well as to thwart illegal
activities such as cybersecurity attacks, theft, odometer fraud,
modifications to air bag systems, and warranty fraud. . . . GM
incorporates TPMs into its vehicle system designs to avoid leaving
connected vehicles vulnerable to cyberattack. Allowing consumers of
vehicle-based telematics services to switch wireless network
providers, or access the underlying software that currently connects
in-vehicle telematics systems to a specific wireless provider, would
remove this protection without offering GM a comparable alternative
for ensuring compliance with important regulatory requirements
and protecting vehicle safety, privacy and security.202

The exemption process provides a temporary, narrow
exception that has no guarantee of renewal. The Librarian of
Congress has failed to revive many exemptions in the past,
undermining any certainty or freedom from liability intended
by the exemption. Prominent failures to renew have involved
Internet blocklists and the right to test certain Digital Rights
Management tools for malicious code.203 The exemption

201 Intellectual Property Owners Ass’n, Comment Letter on Exemption to
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies Under 17 U.S.C. 1201—Sixth Triennial DMCA Rulemaking—Proposed
Class 25 (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715/class
%2025/Intellectual_Property_Owners_Association_Class25_1201_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ABE-4ZQA].
202 General Motors, LLC, Comment Letter on Exemption to Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, Proposed
Class 13, Unlocking-Mobile Connectivity Devices, No. 2014-07 (Mar. 27, 2015),
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715/class%2013/General_Motors_class1
3_1201_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5VH-8S6E]; see also Comment Letter from General
Motors, LLC, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, Proposed Class 25: Security Research, No. 2014-07 (Mar.
27,
2015),
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715/class%2025/
General_Motors_1201_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/28L2-PT3S]. (“Thus, the Proposed
Exemption weakens a vehicle’s carefully designed safety and security framework of which
TPMs are an integral part and accordingly increases the vehicle safety and security
challenges.”)
203 In 2006, an exemption was renewed for

[s]ound recordings, and audiovisual works associated with those sound
recordings, distributed in compact disc format and protected by technological
protection measures that control access to lawfully purchased works and
create or exploit security flaws or vulnerabilities that compromise the
security of personal computers, when circumvention is accomplished solely
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receiving the most attention was the decision to not renew the
jailbreaking exception for smartphones,204 a result so egregious
that it resulted in public outcry and forced Congress to step in
to restore the practice.205
The 2015 rulemaking produced a rule of note. The rule
promulgated as 37 CFR § 201.40(b)(7) provided an exemption
for
Computer programs, where the circumvention is undertaken on a
lawfully acquired device or machine on which the computer program
operates solely for the purpose of good-faith security research and
does not violate any applicable law, including without limitation the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as amended and codified in
title 18, United States Code; and provided, however, that, except as
to voting machines, such circumvention is initiated no earlier than
12 months after the effective date of this regulation, and the device
or machine is one of the following: (A) A device or machine primarily
designed for use by individual consumers (including voting
machines); (B) A motorized land vehicle; or (C) A medical device
designed for whole or partial implantation in patients or a
corresponding personal monitoring system, that is not and will not
be used by patients or for patient care.206

This rule is a mild improvement but contains numerous
flaws, not least of which is the fact that this rule had a delayed
for the purpose of good faith testing, investigating, or correcting such security
flaws or vulnerabilities.
Statement of the Librarian of Congress Relating to Section 1201 Rulemaking, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Nov. 22, 2006), https://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/2006_
statement.html [https://perma.cc/CY4L-KNXW]. This addressed concerns arising from
Sony’s BMG copy-protection scandal, in which undisclosed DRM on music CD’s
installed rootkits on the user’s computer that could subsequently be exploited by
hackers. See Eran Kahana, Sony’s DRM Experience: When Copyright Protection
Attacks, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 627 (2006); Viruses Use Sony Anti-Piracy CDs,
BBC
NEWS
(Nov.
11,
2005
11:11
GMT)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4427606.stm [https://perma.cc/ZM8X-6S36]. This
exemption was not renewed in the following cycle. However, in 2010 a similar
exemption was granted for DRM in video games. While not nearly as widespread,
Ubisoft’s UPlay DRM similarly had an exploit that could have allowed hackers to gain
remote access to a user’s computer. Alec Meer, Ubisoft Responds to UPlay Security Drama,
Issues
Patch,
ROCKPAPERSHOTGUN
(July
30,
2012,
5:31
PM),
https://
www.rockpapershotgun.com/2012/07/30/ubisoft-respond-to-uplay-security-drama/ [https://
perma.cc/489X-A6KN]. This exemption was not renewed in the 2013 rulemaking.
204 See, e.g., Jeff Benjamin, Unlocking a Cell Phone in the U.S. to Become “Illegal”
This Weekend, IDOWNLOAD BLOG (Jan. 24, 2013) http://www.idownloadblog.com/2013/
01/24/unlocking-iphone-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/W6AM-FMDL] (noting re-criminalization of
jailbreaking); Derek Khanna, The Law Against Unlocking Cellphones Is Anti-Consumer,
Anti-Business, and Anti-Common Sense, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2013), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/02/the-law-against-unlocking-cellphones-is-anticonsumer-anti-business-and-anti-common-sense/272894/
[https://perma.cc/2TME-YLDV]
(accusing law restricting jailbreaking as encouraging crony capitalism).
205 See Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act, Pub. L. No.
113-144, 128 Stat. 1751 (2014).
206 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(7) (2017).
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implementation (aside from voting machines), leaving
researchers only two years before renewal hearings.207 The
question of what constitutes a device “primarily designed for
use by individual consumers” is also unresolved. Moreover, the
“good faith” restriction limits the reach of the exemption to
dedicated research in a controlled environment, which may
chill hobbyists and independent researchers. Last, the rule
arrives approximately ten years after researchers noted the
Section 1201(j) statutory exemption would specifically harm
research on voting machine security as it would “exclude
testing of individual software per se” and that it would limit
testing and dissemination in such a way as to “exclude amateur
testers.”208
D.

Resulting Chilling Effects of the Anticircumvention
Provisions

While proponents of Section 1201 argue that chilling
effects are either idiosyncratic or speculative, government
experts’ and security researchers’ testimony tells a very
different story.209 Indeed, former White House Cyber Security
Chief Richard Clarke noted the need for DMCA reform because
of Section 1201’s “chilling effect on vulnerability research.”210
The DMCA crippled the nation’s ability to improve electoral
infrastructure, in particular, the voting machines that tally
votes and the databases that store vital voter information.
Moreover, these are the exact targets that were exploited in the
recent Russian hacking campaign. This Section details the
long-standing complaints of researchers—supported by
207 Kit Walsh, Why Did We Have to Wait a Year to Fix Our Cars?, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2016/10/why-did-we-have-wait-year-fix-our-cars [https://perma.cc/95TW-ZHVY].
208 Doris Estelle Long, Electronic Voting Rights and the DMCA: Another Blast
from the Digital Pirates or a Final Wake Up Call for Reform?, 23 J. MARSHALL J. OF
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 533, 547 (2005) (citation omitted).
209 Matthew Green, Statement on DMCA Lawsuit, A FEW THOUGHTS ON
CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING (July 28, 2016), https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/
2016/07/28/statement-on-dmca-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/6FD3-GRYJ]; see also Petition
for Exemption: Applied Cryptography, Security, and Reverse Engineering Research of Dr.
Matthew Green, In the Matter of Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, No. 2014-07 (2014),
https://copyright.gov/1201/2014/petitions/Green_1201_Initial_Submission_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XD3Y-MVZQ]; Comment by Steven M. Bellovin, et al., Long
Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. 1201 (2015),
https://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-020615/InitialComments_LongForm_
SecurityResearchers_Class25.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY58-UK9L].
210 Hiawatha Bray, Cyber Chief Speaks on Data Network Security, BOS. GLOBE
(Oct. 17, 2002), https://www.cc.gatech.edu/computing/acmnews/msg00300.html [https://
perma.cc/AJ8P-UVRP].
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evidence culled from case law and documented threat letters—
to show that the DMCA chills disclosure of vulnerabilities to
vendors and other academics, as well as chilling research
generally. The specific impact on voting machine research
highlights the need for and potential impact of broader
research freedom in critical infrastructure.
1. Chilling Private Disclosure with Vendors
The DMCA harms researchers’ abilities to communicate
critical vulnerabilities to vendors. For example, security
researcher Mike Davis discovered numerous flaws in the
electronic locks put out by Cyberlock.211 Lock technology
implicates national security because these systems are used in
metro stations, airports, and data centers.212 Davis finalized his
findings on March 30, 2015, and attempted to disclose them to
Cyberlock numerous times over a forty-five day period with
little success.213 As Davis prepared to publish his findings,214 he
received a threatening demand letter from Cyberlock counsel,
criticizing his findings and warning that the company “wants
to ensure there has been no violation of [its intellectual
property] rights, including . . . license agreements or other
intellectual property laws such as the anticircumvention
provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.”215

211 Kim Zetter, With Lock Research, Another Battle Brews in the War over
Security Holes, WIRED (May 6, 2015, 11:14 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/lockresearch-another-battle-brews-war-security-holes/ [https://perma.cc/8XEM-BAUY].
212 Id.
213 Davis noted that he followed Responsible Disclosure, attempting to contact
the company six times:

First notification: March 31, 2015—to Bruce Stephenson, Senior Security
Engineer
in
R&D;
Second
notification:
April
1,
2015—to
Support@cyberlock.com; Third notification: April 9, 2015—to CyberLock
sales; Fourth notification: April 11, 2015—to Tammy (media relations
contact)—Email delivery confirmation received. Fifth notification: April 17,
2015—to CyberLock sales and support; Sixth notification: April 19, 2015—to
CyberLock support
Mike Davis, Security Advisory for Cyberlock Cyberkey, IOACTIVE (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Advisory_CyberLock.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6828VCXX].
214 Id.
215 Tim Cushing, Another Company Thinks the Best Way to Handle a Security
Hole is to Send a Lawyer After the Person Who Discovered It, TECHDIRT (May 7, 2015,
10:33 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150506/11491630903/another-companythinks-best-way-to-handle-security-hole-is-to-send-lawyer-after-person-who-discoveredit.shtml [https://perma.cc/A532-7ZSJ] (quoting Letter from Jones Day to Mike Davis
(Apr. 29, 2015)).
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Understandably, firms would prefer to avoid the
embarrassment of disclosing flaws in their products.216 But, as
one commentator pointed out, no one should doubt the
deleterious effects of “the approach of seeking to maintain the
secrecy of security flaws as a corporate strategy” as this has
been “widely discredited as ineffective in the computer security
literature.”217 This strategy is damaging on multiple fronts. It
prevents correction of problems known in the community,
creates an antagonistic relationship between vendors and the
security researchers assessing the vulnerability of vendors’
products, and creates a culture of inexperience that
undermines the appreciation of reported vulnerabilities. “[O]ne
such reason [for a mass of vulnerabilities in the smart grid] is
that ‘many power industry vendors have limited experience
dealing with the vulnerability disclosure process. So software
vulnerability problems often produce disagreements between
vendors and researchers as to the severity of vulnerabilities
and appropriate mitigation efforts.’”218 Sadly, the DMCA
permits firms to threaten vendors who seek to expose any such
vulnerabilities.
2. Chilling Public Disclosure and Presentation of
Cryptography and Security Research at Academic
Conferences
The DMCA also hampers researchers’ abilities to share
their findings with their colleagues. In 2000, the Secure Digital
Music Initiative (SDMI) invited researchers to attempt to strip
digital watermarks used to protect digital music.219 Edward
216 David Becker, Testing Microsoft and the DMCA, CNET (Aug. 16, 2003, 2:10
PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/testing-microsoft-and-the-dmca/ [https://perma.cc/X3P5M69S] (discussing Microsoft threat); Declan McCullagh, Security Warning Draws DMCA
Threat, CNET (Aug. 1, 2002, 9:48 AM PDT), https://www.cnet.com/news/securitywarning-draws-dmca-threat/ [https://perma.cc/CDB3-7QJH] (H-P threat against
researcher).
217 Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the
First Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 795, 824 (2013).
218 Id. at 825 (quoting What the Power Industry Has to Learn About Cyber
Vulnerability Disclosure, IEEE SMART GRID (Jan. 2012), http://smartgrid.ieee.org/newsletter/
january-2012/479-what-the-power-industry-has-to-learn-about-cyber-vulnerability-disclosure
[https://perma.cc/FC4K-HVCF].
219 SDMI Challenge FAQ, PRINCETON UNIV. (2000), http://sip.cs.princeton.edu/
sdmi/faq.html [https://perma.cc/J29U-YZCW] (“In the first round of the challenge,
SDMI provided four ‘watermark’ challenges and two ‘non-watermark’ challenges, as
described below. For each watermark challenge, three audio streams were presented: a
reference stream in its original form, the same stream with a watermark, and a
challenge stream, watermarked, with no corresponding reference stream. The
challenge was to submit to the SDMI ‘oracle’ (a Web site), a version of the challenge
stream with the watermark removed but without degrading the perceived sound
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Felten, a computer science professor at Princeton, along with
numerous other researchers at Rice and at Xerox met this
challenge.220 But when SDMI learned that Felten and his team
intended to share their results at an academic conference, the
Initiative sent demand letters warning of liability under the
DMCA.221 Though the Initiative acknowledged that Felten was
not seeking to aid infringement, it nonetheless pressed DMCA
claims to ensure Felten would not disclose his findings.
[T]he purpose of releasing your research is not designed to “help
anyone impose or steal anything.” Furthermore, your participation
in the Challenge and your contemplated disclosure appears to be
motivated by a desire to engage in scientific research that will
ensure that SDMI does not deploy a flawed system. Unfortunately,
the disclosure that you are contemplation [sic] could result in
significantly broader consequences and could directly lead to the
illegal
distribution
of
copyrighted
material.
Such
disclosure . . . would subject your research team to enforcement
actions under the DMCA and possibly other federal laws.222

Felten brought suit seeking relief so as to publish his future
papers free from fear.223
In connection with the resulting lawsuit, numerous
researchers and academics submitted declarations asserting
that they felt their research was being chilled, with one
researcher noting he would not publish his results in similar
fields for fear of consequences.224 Niels Ferguson, a
cryptographer in Amsterdam, noted that he had discovered
numerous security flaws in HDCP (an encryption used by Intel)
but had been “chilled from the recording industry’s threats to
quality of the original stream. The oracle would respond by email, after several hours,
with an ‘ACCEPT’ message (if the watermark was removed without degrading the
sound quality too much) or a ‘REJECT’ message. In the second round of the challenge,
SDMI offered additional ‘challenge’ tracks to participants who succeeded in defeating
the original challenges. No oracle was offered. The SDMI requested that participants
send the results of their watermark removal tools along with technical details of how
the watermarks were removed. Following this, the SDMI would then offer participants
the chance to sign a non-disclosure agreement in return for receiving a fraction of the
prize money.”).
220 Id.; see also Peter Wayner, Researchers Struggle with Problems from
Hiding Data, COMPUTERWORLD (May 7, 2001, 1:00 AM PT), https://
www.computerworld.com/article/2592146/security0/researchers-struggle-withproblems-from-hiding-data.html [https://perma.cc/F4DT-P4P7].
221 Letter from Matthew J. Oppenheim, Sec’y, The SDMI Found., to Edward
Felten, Dep’t of Comp. Sci., Princeton Univ. (Apr. 9, 2001), http://sip.cs.princeton.edu/
sdmi/riaaletter.html [https://perma.cc/62EB-YQJK].
222 Id.
223 Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., No. CV-01-2669 (D. N.J. dismissed
Nov. 30, 2001).
224 See Felten, et al., v. RIAA, et al., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: LEGAL CASES,
https://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/ [https://perma.cc/YL8G-5T96] (collecting docket
items, including dismissal for lack of standing).
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Professor Felten’s research.”225 Accordingly, he elected not to
publish his findings:
I have been informed by a U.S. lawyer specialising in this area that
even publishing my paper here in the Netherlands will open the door
to DMCA prosecution and liability. Not publishing this paper will
damage my professional reputation, but if I do publish it I would
never be able to visit the U.S. again. This would do me even more
harm, both professionally and personally.226

Alan Cox, a well-known Welsh programmer with an
extensive background in Linux research, noted that
under the DMCA, I have to choose betweem [sic] keeping quiet when
a flaw is known or discovered in an encryption system or other rights
management tool, which could put my clients at risk—or being
unable to visit the United States without fear of arrest. Without that
ability to tell the truth the fight against crime is weakened and the
possibility that the national security infrastructure of nations is
flawed and weak increases.227

These concerns were stoked after Dmitry Sklyarov, a Russian
researcher, was arrested soon after giving a conference
presentation in the United States on e-book security.228 Similar
fears motivated researchers to consider holding major
conferences, like the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, outside of the United States.229 Other researchers have
taken down their own websites, citing the DMCA.230

225 Declaration of Neils Ferguson at ¶ 1–2, 6–8, Felten v. Recording Indus.
Ass’n of Am., Inc., (D. N.J. dismissed Nov. 30, 2001) (No. CV-01-2669), ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND.: LEGAL CASES https://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20010813_
ferguson_decl.html [https://perma.cc/A66N-PSGU].
226 Id. at ¶ 8.
227 Declaration of Alan Cox at ¶ 13, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am.,
Inc., (D. N.J. dismissed Nov. 30, 2001) (No. CV-01-2669)), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND.: LEGAL CASES https://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20010813_cox_decl.
html [https://perma.cc/LG8H-DMKH].
228 See Julie Hilden, The First Amendment Issues Raised by the Troubling
Prosecution of E-Book Hacker Dmitry Sklyarov, FINDLAW (Aug. 10, 2001), http://
supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the-first-amendment-issues-raised-by-thetroubling-prosecution-of-e-book-hacker-dmitry-sklyarov.html [https://perma.cc/Z7K66E2E]; Robert Lemos, Russian Crypto Expert Arrested at Def Con, CNET (Mar. 2,
2002, 12:05 PM EST) https://www.cnet.com/news/russian-crypto-expert-arrested-atdef-con/ [https://perma.cc/7PQG-2E24].
229 See Declaration of Michael Reiter at ¶ 16, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n
of Am., Inc., (D. N.J. dismissed Nov. 30, 2001) (No. CV-01-2669), ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND.: LEGAL CASES https://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20010813_
reiter_decl.html [https://perma.cc/MMK6-WGLR].
230 Ryan
W. Maple, Dug Song Censors Website, Cites DMCA,
LINUXSECURITY.COM (Sept. 9, 2001, 9:55 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/200109111
42115/http://www.linuxsecurity.com:80/articles/cryptography_article-3624.html
[https://perma.cc/834A-QYTE].
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Preventing researchers from communicating and
building on each other’s findings exacerbates the damage of
these chilling effects. Disclosure of discovered vulnerabilities is
a fundamental component of security innovation, as noted by
technologist Bruce Schneier.
It is a regular practice in the science for a security researcher to
learn from other peoples’ breaks. In order for the academic
disciplines of cryptography and computer security to advance, a
researcher who breaks a security system needs to make his result
available to the rest of the research community. As in any other
academic discipline, this unfettered free exchange of ideas and
research results is the means by which the entire field may benefit
from one person’s research, strengthening all of society’s security as
a result.231

The prevention of public disclosure of vulnerabilities
also prevents corrective market action. As Professor Eugene
Volokh observed, “Publishing detailed information about a
computer program’s security vulnerabilities may. . . . persuade
apathetic users that there really is a serious problem [and]
persuade the media and the public that some software
manufacturer isn’t doing its job.”232 A company has strong
incentives to avoid drawing attention to vulnerabilities, and
therefore attempts to bury them entirely or release muted
warnings. If this information is kept from the public, deficient
vendors may avoid accountability through reduced
consumption of a product and/or constituent pressure on
governmental actors to intervene. Even members of Congress
who follow a dogged, free-market approach, such as Republican
Senator Mike Lee, note the importance of disclosure: “I
generally trust the market to create the right incentives for
retailers to protect data of their customers. But consumers
need notification of data breaches for that to work.”233
While judicially approved prior restraint234 is
exceedingly rare,235 the DMCA has been used to bar publication
231 Declaration of Bruce Schneier at ¶ 13, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of
Am., Inc., (D. N.J. dismissed Nov. 30, 2001) (No. CV-01-2669), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND.: LEGAL CASES, https://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20010813_schneier_
decl.html [https://perma.cc/4D8Y-VUYE].
232 Volokh, supra note 4, at 1118.
233 Kristin M. Bergman, A Target to the Heart of the First Amendment:
Government Endorsement of Responsible Disclosure as Unconstitutional, 13 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 117, 143 (2015) (quoting Summary: Target Testifies on Massive Data Breach,
WALL ST. J.: CORP. INTELLIGENCE BLOG (Feb. 4, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
corporate-intelligence/2014/02/04/live-target-testifies-on-massive-data-breach/
[https://perma.cc/355L-K54V].
234 The extremely odd anticircumvention provision of the DMCA befuddles
researchers and First Amendment scholars alike, in part because the provisions
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of DeCSS code, a method of decrypting the Content Scramble
System on DVD’s, by the magazine 2600: The Hacker
Quarterly.236 The researcher community responded to this
suppression of speech by placing the code on t-shirts and ties,
rendering the code in haiku, and recording spoken-word
monologues.237 In light of the caustic response to the ruling, and
DeCSS’s wide dissemination in spite of the restraint, it is
unclear if another court would sanction this sort of chilling
censorship.
3. Chilling Efficient Research
While the existence of Section 1201 of the DMCA does
not necessarily render impossible certain research topics, it
may instead introduce obstacles that result in less efficient
research. Matthew Green, a professor of computer science and
a security researcher at Johns Hopkins University, detailed
two ways in which Section 1201 slows research: by diverting
resources from scientific to legal questions238 and by forcing
researchers to adopt indirect methods to avoid running afoul of
the law.239
enshrine an absolute secrecy regime antithetical to both disciplines. Here, the DMCA
merges with a more troubling strain of intellectual property doctrine centered on
invention secrecy.
235 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon
papers case involving six separate concurrences discussing the doctrines narrowness or
inapplicability in matters outside of dire national security); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (barring prior restraint in libel and noting that
restraint only appropriate in exceptional cases on national security and decency
grounds); see also Megan L. Shaw, When the Fourth Estate’s Well Runs Dry, 83 BROOK.
L. REV. 701, 705–12 (2018) (detailing history of prior restraint cases).
236 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434–35, 439 (2d Cir. 2001).
237 See
Seth Schoen, The History of the DeCSS Haiku, LOYALTY,
http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/haiku.html [https://perma.cc/VY5D-ZEHC]; David S.
Touretzky, Gallery of CSS Descramblers, CARNEGIE MELON UNIV. COMP. SCI. DEP’T
(2000), http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/Gallery/ [https://perma.cc/6JLE-9UA2].
238 Green, supra note 209 (“Nearly every attempt to analyze a software-based
system presents a danger of running afoul of the law. As a result, the first step in any
research project that involves a commercial system is never science—it’s to call a
lawyer; to ask my graduate students to sign a legal retainer; and to inform them that
even with the best legal advice, they still face the possibility of being sued and losing
everything they have. This fear chills critical security research.”).
239 Green notes that
[i]n a recent project—conducted in Fall 2015—we were forced to avoid
reverse-engineering a piece of software when it would have been the fastest
and most accurate way to answer a research question. Instead, we decided to
treat the system as a black box, recovering its operation only by observing
inputs and outputs. This approach often leads to a less perfect understanding
of the system, which can greatly diminish the quality of security research. It
also substantially increases the time and effort required to finish a project,
which reduces the quantity of security research.
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4. Chilling Investigation and Improvement of Voting
Machines
The DMCA has had a notorious impact on voting
machine security research, with an exemption to the DMCA
granted only after a decade of complaints. The DMCA provided
two methods to retard public discussion regarding voting
machine vulnerabilities: it effectively criminalized the fair-use
reverse engineering240 need to discover vulnerabilities and it
also provided a means to prevent dissemination of
vulnerabilities.241 The willingness to abuse the DMCA seems to
include voting machine manufacturers, with Diebold and
Sequoia issuing baseless threats to hide vulnerabilities. Recent
research, itself conducted after a long overdue DMCA
exemption, revealed critical flaws in the system that have
persisted for decades.
a. Diebold
Diebold used a baseless DMCA copyright claim in an
effort to pull down internal emails discussing vulnerabilities.
Diebold engineers lamented the state of security on their own
machines, writing,
Our smart-card format has absolutely no security, so if someone
were to get a copy of this software and a reader, they could stand at
the ballot station and quietly burn new voters cards all day. . . . I can
see the cover of USA Today in my head. Consider everyone
warned.242

When Diebold learned that hacked emails concerning known
vulnerabilities had been posted to the Internet, the company sent
out multiple DMCA pull-down notices to sites hosting the
information as well as sites merely linking to it. Though Diebold
was ultimately defeated in court by two Swarthmore students,243
the episode was an early example of voting systems
Id.

That is, provided that such reverse engineering would require circumvention.
Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204–05 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (noting that Diebold behavior shows a desire “to use the DMCA’s safe harbor
provisions—which were designed to protect ISPs, not copyright holders—as a sword to
suppress publication of embarrassing content rather than as a shield to protect its
intellectual property.”).
242 Barney Gimbel, Rage Against the Machine: Diebold Struggles to Bounce
Back from the Controversy Surrounding Its Voting Machines, FORTUNE (Nov. 3, 2006,
9:45 AM EST), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/
13/8393084/index.htm [https://perma.cc/98Z7-MDKK]
243 Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1197, 1204.
240

241
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manufacturers attempting to use the DMCA to hide
vulnerabilities.
Diebold was subsequently accused of attempting to
thwart third-party testing244 and spreading misinformation
about the certification of their machines.245 As part of a $2.6
million settlement with the State of California, Diebold agreed
to make necessary security enhancements.246 Prominent among
these were the requirement to replace hard-coded (that is, static)
features with dynamic features.247 Diebold was required to
“[r]eplace hard-coded supervisor passwords with dynamic
passwords” and to “[r]eplace hard-coded Data Encryption
Standard (DES) security key with [programmable] encryption
keys.”248
b. Sequoia
Felten, the researcher who was threatened by SDMI
and criticized by Diebold, later received a demand letter from
Sequoia Voting Systems when the e-voting machine company
learned that New Jersey election officials planned to send
machines to Felten for analysis.249 The letter noted “Sequoia
has . . . retained counsel to stop any infringement of our
intellectual properties, including any non-compliant analysis.
We will also take appropriate steps to protect against any
publication of Sequoia software, its behavior, reports regarding
same or any other infringement of our intellectual property.”250

244 Ed Felten, Refuting Diebold’s Response, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Sept. 20,
2006), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2006/09/20/refuting-diebolds-response/ [https://
perma.cc/52S8-HHXG].
245 Diebold May Face Criminal Charges, WIRED (Apr. 23. 2004, 8:55 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2004/04/diebold-may-face-criminal-charges/ [https://perma.cc/K7TR3S5J]; Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Justice Office of the Attorney Gen., Attorney General
Lockyer Announces $2.6 Million Settlement with Diebold in Electronic Voting Lawsuit
(Nov.
10,
2004),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-lockyerannounces-26-million-settlement-diebold-electronic [https://perma.cc/N29N-HFW2].
246 [Proposed] Stipulated Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 6, 9–20,
California v. Diebold Election Sys., Inc., (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2004) (No. RG 03128466),
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/04-130.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8PE
-XR6V]. The latter requirement is telling as DES had been hacked in 1999 and replaced in
the US government by the Advanced Encryption Standard in 2002. NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., FIPS PUB. 197, ANNOUNCING THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD
(AES) (2001).
247 [Proposed] Stipulated Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, supra
note 246, at 17–19.
248 Id. at 17–18.
249 Ed Felten, Interesting Email from Sequoia, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Mar. 17,
2008), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2008/03/17/interesting-email-sequoia/ [https://perma.cc/
87BS-KTZ5].
250 Id.
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This letter was widely derided, with commentators noting “[i]t’s
hard to imagine a stupider legal threat.”251
c. DEFCON Hacking Competition Reveals Widespread
Vulnerabilities
A recent group hacking exercise demonstrated the
myriad of vulnerabilities that exist (and persist) in e-voting
machines. Matt Blaze, a professor at the University of
Pennsylvania, helped set up a voting machine hacking event at
DEFCON, an annual hacking convention.252 The event involved
thirty machines representing the major manufacturers
including Sequoia AVC Edge, ES&S iVotronic, Diebold TSX,
WinVote, and Diebold Expresspoll 4000.253 It appears to be the
first of its kind, as such activity was illegal under the DMCA
until an exemption was created in 2015.254 The event involved
several luminaries in the field, including Harri Hursti, one of
the first researchers to hack an e-voting machine.255
The results of the event were sobering, with roughly
thirty machines hacked using known exploits within the first
ninety minutes. A WinVote terminal was hacked using a basic
Windows XP exploit dating back to 2003. Indeed, a participant
noted that the “[h]ardest part of hacking WINVote was buying
a USB keyboard. CTR-alt-delete boots voting machine into
Windows XP.”256 The encryption key used for the wireless
251 Cory Doctorow, Sequoia Voting Systems Threatens Felten’s Princeton
Security Research
Team,
BOING BOING (Mar.
17, 2008 8:47 PM),
http://boingboing.net/2008/03/17/sequoia-voting-syste.html
[https://perma.cc/QV8N4BEB].
252 MATT BLAZE ET AL., DEFCON 25 VOTING MACHINE HACKING VILLAGE
REPORT ON CYBER VULNERABILITIES IN U.S. ELECTION EQUIPMENT, DATABASES, AND
INFRASTRUCTURE 4 (Sept. 2017), https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20
CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH3K-XPAC].
253 #Votingvillage Is a Hit!, DEFCON COMMS. INC. (July 28, 2017), https://
www.defcon.org/html/defcon-25/dc-25-index.html [https://perma.cc/M96Y-WD4H].
254 See Elizabeth Weise, Hackers Plan to Break into 30 Voting Machines to Put
Election Meddling to the Test, USA TODAY (July 27, 2017, 9:04 PM EST),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/07/26/voting-machines-hackers-election-hack/5
07071001/ [https://perma.cc/2ZWK-46F8].
255 See DAVID WAGNER ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE DIEBOLD ACCUBASIC
INTERPRETER 6
(2006),
https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/security_diebold_
accubasic.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4HB-Z2CA] (detailing the Hursti Hack and noting Hursti’s
role in spurring concerns on e-voting security); Edward-Isaac Dovere, Top Hacker
Conference to Target Voting Machines, POLITICO (May 23, 2017, 4:34 PM EDT),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/23/defcon-hacker-conference-voting-machines-238734
[https://perma.cc/23UA-8XUU].
256 Sean Gallager (@thepacketrat), TWITTER (July 29, 2017, 1:33 PM),
https://twitter.com/thepacketrat/status/891396377208647681 [https://perma.cc/3K8BLFUR] (showing hack of voter machine to play Rick Astley’s “Never Gonna Give You
Up,” a common meme known as Rick-rolling); DEFCON VotingVillage
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connection on the machine was “abcde.”257 Voter information
was also insecure, as hackers “found actual voter reg[istration]
data from the 2008 election in . . . plain text” stored on
machines.258
While the mass researcher hack of voter machines was
without precedent, their results were not.259 As seen from
occasions where states have requested audits of voting
machines, sloppy protections are the norm.260 In 2015, the
Virginia Information Technologies Agency examined WINVote
machines following repeated crashes during the 2014
election.261 VITA’s report recommended
discontinuing use of the Advanced Voting System WINVote
devices . . . [due to] weak security controls used by the devices [that]
would not be able to prevent a malicious third party from modifying
the votes recorded by the WINVote devices. The primary contributor
to these findings is a combination of weak security controls used by
the devices, namely, the use of encryption protocols that are not
secure, weak passwords, and insufficient system hardening.262

(@VotingVillageDC), TWITTER (July 29, 2017, 1:33 PM), https://twitter.com/
VotingVillageDC/status/891392969881812993 [https://perma.cc/NA4D-GTDU] (same).
257 Shuguh Works, Voting Machine Hacking Village DEF CON 25, YOUTUBE
(July 29, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADyfcz6MUD4 [https://perma.cc/
4PJW-9JLQ].
258 Sean Gallager (@thepacketrat), TWITTER (July 29, 2017, 2:48 PM),
https://twitter.com/thepacketrat/status/891369912119197696 [https://perma.cc/F9CPKC4V]; Kevin Collier, Personal Info of 650,000 Voters Discovered on Poll Machine
Sold on Ebay, GIZMODO (Aug. 1, 2017, 2:50 PM), http://gizmodo.com/personal-info-of650-000-voters-discovered-on-poll-mach-1797438462 [https://perma.cc/3SGX-F9GR].
259 See Weise, supra note 254; see also Sean Michael Kerner, Hackers
Demonstrate Voting Machine Vulnerabilities at DefCon, EWEEK (July 28, 2017),
http://www.eweek.com/security/hackers-demonstrate-voting-machine-vulnerabilitiesat-defcon [https://perma.cc/FF7C-5B6H]; Ben Wofford, How to Hack an Election in 7
Minutes,
POLITICO
(Aug.
5,
2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-elections-russia-hack-how-tohack-an-election-in-seven-minutes-214144 [https://perma.cc/9CEL-XFPS]; Hacking the
Machines—Coverage Finally!, HOLLER BACK-[NOT] VOTING IN AN AMERICAN TOWN
(Aug. 12, 2016),
http://www.hollerbackfilm.com/blog/2016/8/6/coverage-on-the-hacking-of-the-machinesfinally [https://perma.cc/W7PH-NVHE].
260 Cory Bennett, States Ditch Electronic Voting Machines, HILL (Nov. 11, 2014,
9:00 AM EST) http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/222470-states-ditch-electronicvoting-machines [https://perma.cc/5JLE-QAYA] (noting successful efforts to
demonstrate vulnerabilities in these machines).
261 See
generally
VIRGINIA INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AGENCY,
COMMONWEALTH SECURITY & RISK MANAGEMENT, SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF WINVOTE
VOTING EQUIPMENT FOR DEP’T OF ELECTIONS (2015), http://www.elections.virginia.gov/
WebDocs/VotingEquipReport/WINVote-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/4D2G-R535]; Kim
Zetter, Virginia Finally Drops America’s ‘Worst Voting Machines,’ WIRED (Aug. 17,
2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/virginia-finally-drops-americas-worstvoting-machines/ [http://perma.cc/G46B-N6VF].
262 VIRGINIA INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AGENCY, supra note 261.
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Among these weaknesses were the aforementioned
“abcde” Wi-Fi password, a failure to patch the system for eleven
years, and a hardwired administrator password of “admin.”263
Following the publication of the report, Virginia decertified the
machine, roughly seven years after security issues connected to
the machines’ always-on Wi-Fi first surfaced.264
IV.

PROPOSAL: ELIMINATING THE INDEPENDENT
ANTICIRCUMVENTION RIGHT AND ADOPTING A
RESPONSIBLE OPEN COMMUNITY MODEL IN
CYBERSECURITY

As should now be obvious, cyber-warfare is prevalent
and growing. Moreover, the current approach to intellectual
property law in light of national security is deficient, thus
crippling our cyber-defense. We must increase transparency
while enlisting the aid of academics and altruistic researchers
to both prevent and detect intrusions.
This Section details the proposed solution. First,
Congress should remove Section 1201(a)(2), limit Sections
1201(a)(1) and 1201(b) to underlying acts of infringement, and
encourage independent security researchers (“ethical hackers”
or “white hats”). Second, Congress should adopt a cyber risk
assessment paradigm to combat reflexive secrecy and
strengthen existing assets.
A.

Removal of DMCA Section 1201(a)(2) and Establishing
a Stringent Infringement Nexus Requirement for
Anticircumvention

The Copyright Office appears to realize that the
restrictions of Section 1201 pose a serious threat to security
research.265 The Office, however, seeks to address this vital
weakness through piecemeal exemptions, doled out in triennial
cycles.266 This is unsurprising, as the Office is primarily focused
on balancing the interests of rights holders and users, not the
security of the nation. Moreover, rights holders may tap into an
outdated IP security doctrine of secrecy to argue against broad
security exemptions.
263 Jeremy Epstein, The Worst Voting Machine in America, SLATE (Apr. 16,
2015, 1:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/04/avs_
winvote_virginia_voting_machine_s_password_was_admin.html
[http://perma.cc/R6ZJBPVN].
264 Zetter, supra note 261.
265 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 185, at 71–81.
266 Id. at 140–49.
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The urgency of the current climate forces a more direct
and logical solution. Section 1201(a)(2) must be repealed, and
Section 1201(a)(1) must be amended to cover only
circumvention directed to unlawful infringement of established
rights of copyright holders, rather than creating an intent-free,
broad, and novel access right. This would bring Section 1201 in
line with the Federal Circuit’s limited reading of Section 1201
from its decision in Chamberlain.267 Moreover, this approach
would eliminate the need for the narrow exemptions, as there
are numerous other lawful activities that are not captured by
the current exemptions.
Section 1201(a)(1) should therefore be amended as
follows: “Circumvention of a technological measure shall not be
considered a violation of this title unless that circumvention is
undertaken to engage in a use that is an infringement of
copyright.” Section 1201(a)(2) would thus be removed as
redundant of 1201(b).
B.

Abandoning Security Through Obscurity in the Realm of
Cybersecurity

In order to prevent the invention secrecy doctrine from
inexorably pulling policy towards a security through obscurity
approach, the government should adopt a responsible open
community risk-assessment with regards to cybersecurity. To
that end, the government should continue to establish openended bounties for vulnerabilities into critical infrastructure.
More critically, though, the government should establish itself
as an intermediary to facilitate responsible disclosure.
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT),
which already solicits information regarding phishing and
other
malware
encounters,
should
similarly
solicit
vulnerability
information
and
communicate
such
vulnerabilities to vendors. While this system of disclosure will
not be mandatory, it will likely attract interest from security
researchers who are frustrated with vendors’ antagonism and
lack of response.
C.

Responsible Defense in Depth-Open Community
Principles

A responsible community approach reflects a defense in
depth philosophy. Defense in depth is a “holistic approach—one
267

See supra notes 154–161 and accompanying text.
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that uses specific countermeasures implemented in layers to
create an aggregated, risk-based security posture.”268 An open
community harnesses the efforts of researchers to create two
additional layers of defense: detection of vulnerabilities to
prevent intrusions and detection of odd system behaviors to
limit the impact of initially successful intrusions.
The wisdom of this approach centers on three principles:
(1) independent researchers (i.e., members of the wider security
community) are a vital part of security; (2) hiddenness of
defenses decreases in utility as the number of attacks
increases; and (3) while disclosure may increase risk in the
short term, disclosure is necessary for long-term security.
These principles are borne out in the real world and point to
responsible openness as the optimal approach in the realm of
cybersecurity.
1. Independent Security Researchers Aid in Discovering
Vulnerabilities and Detecting Intrusions
Market realities already point to the efficiency of
enlisting independent security researchers to detect highseverity security weaknesses. Ethical hackers routinely ferret
out and responsibly report vulnerability, often for bounties.
Numerous companies run bounty programs in which users are
rewarded for discovering exploits. For example, Apple will pay
up to $250,000 for iPhone exploits.269 Exploit brokers, like
Zerodium, have offered as much as $1.5 million for exploits.270
While these are the highest sorts of payments, the average
bounty paid to ethical hackers is approximately $2,000.271

268 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INDUS. CONTROL SYS. CYBER EMERGENCY
RESPONSE TEAM, RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: IMPROVING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM
CYBERSECURITY WITH DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH STRATEGIES at III (Sept. 2016), https://icscert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_
in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS3V-NEFJ].
269 Dan Goodin, iPhone Exploit Bounty Surges to an Eye-Popping $1.5 Million,
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 29, 2016, 7:30 PM), https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/09/1-5million-bounty-for-iphone-exploits-is-sure-to-bolster-supply-of-0days/ [https://perma.cc/
MJ2V-3QMX] (noting that bounties “will also ensure that an ample supply of zeroday
exploits remain in the wild, despite the non-trivial strides Apple, Google, and other
software makers continue to make in security [sic] their products”).
270 Id.
271 Morgan Chalfant, Dem Pushes ‘Ethical Hacking’ Resolution, HILL (July 19,
2017, 5:25 PM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/342803-dem-pushesethical-hacking-resolution [https://perma.cc/ZV3S-4DGW].
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Google maintains a bug leaderboard as a means to generate
interest and praise for bug hunters.272
In recognition of the economic and national security
benefits of this exploit activity, members of Congress have
called for the development of programs that “prepare students
for careers in cybersecurity by actively promoting ethical
hacking skills.”273 Similarly, the Hack DHS Act was introduced
to encourage ethical hacking attempts against the Department
of Homeland Security.274 Similar bug bounty programs have
been launched for the Pentagon,275 Air Force,276 and Army.277
The Hack the Pentagon program278 has been praised as
revealing “hundreds of vulnerabilities at a fraction of the cost
of commercial penetration testing.”279 Relatedly, agencies have
called for the recruitment of ethical hackers to serve as cyber
special agents.280

272 Taylor Hatmaker, Google’s Bug Bounty Program Pays Out $3 Million, Mostly
for Android and Chrome Exploits, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 31, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/
2017/01/31/googles-bug-bounty-2016/ [https://perma.cc/DQE6-RG8V].
273 Chalfant, supra note 271.
274 H.R. 2774, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
house-bill/2774/text?r=21 [https://perma.cc/97SH-PRPT]; Maggie Hassan & Rob Portman,
Why We’re Encouraging Ethical Hackers to Try and Hack the Department of Homeland
Security, TIME (June 30, 2017), http://time.com/4837557/hackers-homeland-securitycyber-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/GH4L-652N].
275 ‘Hack the Pentagon’ Pilot Program Opens for Registration, DOD NEWS (Mar.
31, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/710033/hack-the-pentagon-pilotprogram-opens-for-registration/ [https://perma.cc/5CDJ-KWHM]; #RSAC: US Government
Bug Bounty Programs Here to Stay Under Trump Administration, INFOSECURITY (Feb.
14, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/rsac-us-government-bugbounty/ [https://perma.cc/B8VM-785X].
276 Kate Conger, Air Force Launches Bug Bounty Program, TECHCRUNCH
(Apr. 26, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/26/air-force-launches-bug-bountyprogram/ [https://perma.cc/MD9H-V67U].
277 Mark Rockwell, Why Bug Bounty Programs Are Worth the Risk, FCW (Mar.
30, 2017), https://fcw.com/articles/2017/03/30/bug-bounties-gsa-dod.aspx [https://perma.cc/
QUT2-GUDX].
278 Meredith Somers, Lessons Learned from DoD’s Bug Bounties Highlight Gaps in
Talent, Secrecy, FED. NEWS RADIO (Mar. 30, 2017, 6:07 PM), https://federalnewsradio.com/
cybersecurity/2017/03/lessons-learned-from-dods-bug-bounties-highlight-talent-gap-secrecyis-not-security/ [https://perma.cc/J2PN-EBVQ].
279 Rockwell, supra note 277. Of course, the government is more likely to
attract grey hat hacking, in part because the CFAA does not apply to government
security testing. See Andrea O’Sullivan, The Economics of Software-Vulnerability Sales:
Can the Feds Encourage ‘Pro-Social’ Hacking?, REASON (Aug. 11, 2015), https://
reason.com/archives/2015/08/11/economics-of-the-zero-day-sales-market
[https://perma.cc/836T-5P68] (noting that while grey hats may be helpful, the ultimate
goal of government should be to encourage white hats).
280 Becky Yerak, FBI Seeks ‘Ethical’ Hackers to be ‘Cyber Special Agents’, CHI.
TRIB. (Dec. 29, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-fbi-ethicalhackers-1229-biz-20141229-story.html [https://perma.cc/3CRJ-LL39].
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Even in areas without bounties, so-called white hats281
have used their talents to thwart cyberattacks or expose
vulnerabilities.282 As noted earlier, the WannaCry attack would
have been much more virulent but for the actions of an ethical
hacker, Marcus Hutchins.283 Similarly, a group of ethical
hackers demonstrated how touch ID systems on both the Apple
iPhone284 and the Samsung Galaxy 5285 could be easily defeated
to gain access to payment software.
281 Hackers are commonly divided into black hats, grey hats, and white hats,
following the color scheme of old westerns. White Hat Hackers and the Future of Cyber
Security
Monitoring,
MASSIVE
MEDIA
(Sept.
26,
2016),
https://
www.massivealliance.com/2016/09/26/white-hat-hackers-future-cyber-securitymonitoring/ [https://perma.cc/J62H-3LCQ]. Black hats are malicious hackers who
attempt to penetrate and disrupt systems. This may be for financial or political gain or
the simple enjoyment of causing chaos, commonly described as “for the lulz.” See, e.g.,
Jack Morse, Script Kiddies May Be Working to Bring Back WannaCry Just for the Lulz,
MASHABLE (May 19, 2017), http://mashable.com/2017/05/19/wannacry-hackersransomware-lulz/#8qfO4pQJcSqj [https://perma.cc/F76V-5543] (Security Researcher
Marcus Hutchins noting that a group of hackers attempted to revive WannaCry by
knocking out the domain functioning as a kill-switch and ascribing their motivation
“it’s most likely scriptkiddies [i.e., low skill hackers] doing it for lulz”). Grey-hat
hackers attempt to penetrate systems but typically sell the resulting vulnerability.
White-hat hackers penetrate systems but do so with either the permission of the target
or with the express purpose of exposing the vulnerability. See Georg Thomas, An
Ethical Hacker Can Help You Beat a Malicious One, GCN (May 22, 2017),
https://gcn.com/Articles/2017/05/22/ethical-hackers.aspx?Page=1
[https://perma.cc/R6P8-MP66]. It has been noted that “[s]ome white hats are reformed
black hats.” Paul Gil, What Are ‘Black Hat’ and ‘White Hat’ Hackers?, LIFEWIRE (Jan.
22,
2018),
https://www.lifewire.com/black-hat-hacker-a-white-hat-hacker-4061415
[https://perma.cc/NEU7-EKGN]; see also Steve Morgan, Black-Hat Hackers More
Daring and Experienced Than White-Hat Hackers, CSO (Mar. 29, 2017, 7:53 AM PST),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/3186225/leadership-management/black-hat-hackers-moredaring-and-experienced-than-white-hat-hackers.html
[https://perma.cc/7MPR-LZL4]
(“Many of the ‘white-hats’ I know are former grey or black hats. As such trying to put people
in buckets like this is hard.”).
282 It should be noted that the United States is not alone in threatening ethical
hackers. See, e.g., Adnan Farooqui, Hungarian Teen Discovers Major Security Flaw, Gets
Arrested, UBERGIZMO (July 25, 2017, 10:33 PST), http://www.ubergizmo.com/2017/07/
hungarian-teen-discovers-major-security-flaw-gets-arrested/ [https://perma.cc/S5EQ-SKDW].
283 It should be noted that Hutchins may have created and distributed
malware unrelated to WannaCry before stopping that attack, though members of the
security community contest that. See Karen Epper Hoffman, A Black and White Issue?,
SC MEDIA
(Nov.
7,
2016),
https://www.scmagazine.com/a-black-and-whiteissue/article/571260/ [https://perma.cc/7CPY-NZHV];; Rachel Greenspan, A Black Hat
Hacker that Changed His Colour, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 25, 2017),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/a-black-hat-hacker-that-changedhis-colour/article21305337/ [https://perma.cc/9DUE-LTBX]; Aidan Knowles, How Black
Hats and White Hats Collaborate to Be Successful, SECURITYINTELLIGENCE (May 4,
2016),
https://securityintelligence.com/how-black-hats-and-white-hats-collaborate-tobe-successful/ [https://perma.cc/JE9E-4TDC]; Greenberg, supra note 91.
284 Dan Goodin, Defeating Apple’s Touch ID: It’s Easier than You May Think,
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 23, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2013/09/defeating-apples-touch-id-its-easier-than-you-may-think/
[https://
perma.cc/4XUH-7PU7].
285 Dan Goodin, Fingerprint Lock in Samsung Galaxy 5 Easily Defeated by
Whitehat Hackers, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 15, 2014, 11:52 AM), https://arstechnica.com/
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2. Hiddenness Is Less Valuable than Flexibility in the
Face of Repetitive Attack
Hiddenness is an asset when defenses are unique or
attacks are infrequent. In general, security systems can be
assessed in terms of the number of attempts an attacker is likely
to make, what information an attacker gains with each attempt,
and whether a community of attackers exists to communicate
knowledge.286
To sketch a crude example of the continuum, consider
the value of a covered hole, a machine gun nest, and a wall in
relation to their hiddenness.287A covered hole is likely to trap
rushing troops only once. Its very success relies on hiddenness
that, by definition, will be removed once it is triggered. It
cannot defeat multiple waves of attackers.288 A machine gun
nest may repel a few waves of attackers, so while its
hiddenness may contribute to success in the short term, it will
either be moved or overrun in the face of repeated waves of
attack.289 A wall has very little hiddenness, but in theory it may
continue to survive attacks if it is monitored and maintained,
being rebuilt as enemies attempt to tear it down. If an opening
forms in the wall, it is critical that the defenders learn of and
repair the breach before attackers can storm through.290
In the context of network security in a climate of global
cyberwarfare, it is anticipated that attackers will be relentless,
will seek to glean information from each attempt, and will
communicate their findings to others.291 An encryption scheme
must resist innumerable attempts at decryption. In such an
environment, adaptability, rather than static secrecy, is more
likely to yield positive results. Vulnerabilities may be
uncovered in many ways by many actors. Because any one
mechanism is likely to fail, risk management requires a design
involving multiple layers of security.292 To continue the wall
metaphor, what is needed is walls within walls, such that the
information-technology/2014/04/fingerprint-lock-in-samsung-galaxy-5-easily-defeatedby-whitehat-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/XT4A-4JWW].
286 See Peter P. Swire, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different
About Computer and Network Security?, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 163, 176 (2004).
287 Id. at 176–78.
288 Id. at 176.
289 Id. at 177.
290 Id. at 180.
291 Id. at 179–80.
292 “Built-in mechanisms should be designed into the system to compensate for
these failures. Layers in this context include, but are not limited to, technologies, operations,
procedures and policies. Protecting the perimeter alone is never sufficient protection. The
perimeter is merely a part of the holistic security approach.” HURSTI, supra note 5, at 2.
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defeat of one does not yield the defeat of the entire system.
Provided those vulnerabilities are timely addressed, the system
may grow and survive to continue providing security.
That is not to say that secrecy need be totally
abandoned. The release of secret information such as a
passcode would likely help attackers more than defenders.
While public disclosure of information may be a necessary
motivation for change, reasonable private disclosure is
preferable.293
3. The Desirability of Responsible Disclosure
It is of course obvious that a system is stronger when
defenders learn of vulnerabilities before attackers, are
motivated to address vulnerabilities, and are able to
communicate with each other to learn of additional potential
vulnerabilities. While community vigilance is needed to
address the first issue, incentivizing disclosure is a necessary
component of the latter two. The system cannot function if
disclosure does not occur, does not trigger adjustment, or is so
rapid as to invite mischief before adjustments can be made.
Clearly, disclosure cannot occur if research into
vulnerabilities is chilled. Thankfully, there are systematic
features that naturally encourage academics and white-hat
hackers to disclose their findings, provided that penalties for
disclosure are absent. Academics are likely to disclose their
findings to colleagues as part of the research cycle. White-hat
hackers are likely to disclose their findings to the public for
community recognition or altruistic reasons. These groups need
only be protected from legal threats in order to propagate
discoveries. The modification of the Section 1201(a)(1)
anticircumvention statute serves this purpose. As noted above,
grey hat hackers are likely to disclose for payment.
While the U.S. government has hidden and stockpiled
vulnerabilities, it is still possible that adversaries will discover
these vulnerabilities.294 A RAND study found that “[e]xploits
and their underlying vulnerabilities have a rather long average
life expectancy (6.9 years).”295 However, “[f]or a given stockpile
of . . . vulnerabilities, after a year, approximately 5.7 percent
have been discovered by an outside entity.”296 Accordingly, the
Swire, supra note 286, at 191.
LILLIAN ABLON & ANDY BOGART, ZERO DAYS, THOUSANDS OF NIGHTS: THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF ZERO-DAY VULNERABILITIES AND THEIR EXPLOITS, at x (RAND Corp., 2017).
295 Id.
296 Id.
293
294
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government should err on the side of disclosure. Indeed, the
government’s failure to disclose vulnerabilities contributed to
the success of WannaCry, Petya,297 and other malware.298
The difficulty, however, is that the lead-time vendors
may need to address vulnerabilities so that public disclosure
does not give information to attackers and provide additional
opportunity for intrusion. RAND found that “[o]nce an
exploitable vulnerability has been found, time to develop a fully
functioning exploit is relatively fast, with a median time of
[twenty-two] days.”299 There are prominent examples of the
damage that can be done due to premature disclosure, as
occurred in the heartbleed leak.300 On the whole, however, it
appears that non-disclosure or unmotivated vendors301 pose a
much greater threat as vulnerabilities will not be addressed in
the time before full attack.302
The consistent complaint of researchers is that vendors
may be difficult to reach and may react antagonistically.
Accordingly, the government also must establish itself as a
recommended
intermediary
in
security
vulnerability
disclosures. The US-CERT should establish a clearinghouse to
facilitate disclosure. Individuals with knowledge of a
vulnerability could report that vulnerability directly to USCERT, which would then assume the responsibility of notifying
the target vendor. While such a clearinghouse would be
redundant for vendors that actively solicit bug reports, it would
be beneficial to standardize methods of disclosure. Moreover,
should disclosing parties wish to attract community praise, the
clearinghouse could offer recognition opportunities such as
accolades and leaderboards. Governmental review of
vulnerabilities may also help clarify responsible disclosure
Newman, supra note 86.
Kafeine, Adylkuzz Cryptocurrency Mining Malware Spreading for Weeks
Via
EternalBlue/DoublePulsar,
PROOFPOINT
(May
15,
2017),
https://
www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/adylkuzz-cryptocurrency-mining-malwarespreading-for-weeks-via-eternalblue-doublepulsar [https://perma.cc/65M6-NVDP].
299 ABLON & BOGART, supra note 294, at xiii.
300 Ben Grubb, Heartbleed Disclosure Timeline: Who Knew What and When,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 15, 2014, 4:16 PM), http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/securityit/heartbleed-disclosure-timeline-who-knew-what-and-when-20140414-zqurk.html [https://
perma.cc/8TQS-GZDF].
301 Ming Yi Ang & Asankhaya Sharma, Un-patched for Months, Could Cisco 0-day
Lead to Another Round of WannaCry?, SOURCECLEAR (May 25, 2017), https://www.source
clear.com/blog/Un-patched-for-months-could-Cisco-0-day-lead-to-another-round-of-WannaCry
—-SourceClear/ [https://perma.cc/SMD4-SXCR] (noting that an exploit similar to EternalBlue,
Cisco 0-Day, CVE-2017-3881, was not patched until 61 days after it was leaked by Wikileaks).
302 HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE, HPE SECURITY RESEARCH: CYBER RISK
REPORT 2015 62–63 (2015), http://h20195.www2.hpe.com/V4/getpdf.aspx/4aa5-0858enn
[https://perma.cc/6NSQ-QMXF].
297

298
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protocols “by interfacing between researcher and vendor on
metrics like severity, likelihood of exploitation, and impact to the
vendor’s business”303 and threats to critical infrastructure. A
standardized disclosure timeline may result from such
collaboration.
D.

National Security Advantages Attendant to the Proposal
1. Increase National Security by Removing Chill and
Creating Additional Incentives for Ethical Hackers

This article’s proposal would strengthen national
security by withdrawing a regulatory chill on needed
encryption and security research. Facilitating academic
publishing will broaden the scope of knowledge and stimulate
additional investigation by valuable actors, while at the same
time aligning with other constitutional principles of the free
flow of ideas.304 Removing the current independent
anticircumvention sections of Section 1201 also would increase
security by allowing white-hat tinkerers to discover existing
vulnerabilities or to detect intrusions.
For example, if Russian hackers had been successful in
hacking voting machine manufacturers to preload malware in
voting machines, allowing review of software might discover
such a practice. This scenario is not at all far-fetched, as
Russians did in fact penetrate some manufacturers.305 In a
related vein, the systematic cheating of the emissions standard
by Volkswagen would have likely been discovered by gearhead
modders if only they had the ability to legally explore their own
car software.306
Ideally, vulnerabilities will be detected and patched
before exploits are created. It is foolish to believe, however,
that defenders will always be ahead of the curve. Instead, we
need a robust population of defenders to observe and react to
possibly altered systems to limit the damage caused by
intrusions.
2. Greater Institutional Coherence
The proposal also addresses the odd hypocrisy of
national actors imploring ethical hackers and security
303
304
305
306

Klein, supra note 5.
See supra Section III.D.2.
See supra Section I.A.1.
See infra notes 324–328.
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researchers to assist while at the same time offering vendors
the tools to chill those allies. It makes little sense for the
government to remove oversight of encryption publications by
relaxing export controls but to also empower third parties to
police those very same publications on copyright grounds. The
institutional incoherence is demonstrated by the NTIA
insisting that the Copyright Office is unqualified to take up
national security concerns, while at the same time the
Copyright Office is compelled to limit exemptions in the face of
those very same concerns.307 Limiting DMCA anticircumvention
to underlying acts of copyright infringement will free the
Copyright Office of the burden of weighing impacts best
assessed by other agencies.
3. Greater Vendor Motivation to Address
Vulnerabilities
Vendors have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to
attack researchers rather than acknowledge and address
vulnerabilities. By removing a judicial lever and creating the
option for governmental mediation, vendors will be more
motivated to address vulnerabilities in an expeditious manner.
Standardizing the vulnerability process will also allow vendors
to build up necessary experience in confronting vulnerabilities
discovered by third parties.308
4. Financial Benefits by Preventing Loss Attendant to
Attacks
The cost of cyberattacks is staggering. While ransoms
paid to recover data represent dramatic examples of economic
loss,309 the bulk of economic harm is caused by lost productivity
during downtime. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
See supra Section III.B.2.
See supra Section III.D.2.
309 A wave of ransomware attacks against hospitals generated a great deal of
press coverage in 2016. Hospitals Are Hit with 88% of All Ransomware Attacks,
BECKER’S
HOSPITAL
REV.
(July
27,
2016),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/hospitalsare-hit-with-88-of-all-ransomware-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/G5UG-WX3J]; Keith
Wagstaff, Big Paydays Force Hospitals to Prepare for Ransomware Attacks, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 23, 2016, 6:06 AM EST), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/big-paydaysforce-hospitals-prepare-ransomware-attacks-n557176 [https://perma.cc/8WFP-KGCM]
(describing the high-profile attack that was settled for a ransom of $17,000, though cost
to consumer confidence and network infrastructure was likely much higher); Kim
Zetter, Why Hospitals Are the Perfect Targets for Ransomware, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2016 1:31
PM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/ransomware-why-hospitals-are-the-perfect-targets/
[http://perma.cc/WD9D-EHJR].
307

308
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against businesses typically cost $40,000 per hour, with most
attacks lasting longer than six hours.310 The massive DDoS
attack in 2016, which brought down “The New York Times,
Twitter, Pinterest, Reddit, GitHub, Etsy, Tumblr, Spotify,
PayPal, Verizon, Comcast, EA, and the PlayStation network,”
occasioned further analysis of downtime costs.311 The average
cost to businesses was estimated at a staggering $22,000 per
minute. 312
This article’s proposal will encourage researchers to
address vulnerabilities, thereby diminishing the effectiveness
of attacks. This can be accomplished on two fronts, by
strengthening consumer-side devices and by lowering the number
of bots available for mass DDoS attacks against service providers.
5. Encouraging STEM Education
This proposal will further Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) education by
broadening the resources available for research, by elevating
the status of white-hat hackers, and by increasing
opportunities for young persons to engage in ethical hacking.
Ethical hacking has been recognized as an effective means of
recruiting student interest313 and imparting necessary security
skills.314 These opinions are largely reflected in the comments of
the Association of American Universities, the American
310 TIM MATTHEWS, INCAPSULA SURVEY: WHAT DDOS ATTACKS REALLY COST
BUSINESSES 6 (2014), https://lp.incapsula.com/rs/incapsulainc/images/eBook%20-%20D
DoS%20Impact%20Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H4Z-UTKJ].
311 Robinson Meyer & Adrienne LaFrance, When the Entire Internet Seems to
Break at Once, ATLANTIC (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2016/10/when-the-entire-internet-seems-to-break-at-once/504956/
[https://perma.cc/H2GY-32PM].
312 CYBER SECURITY ON THE OFFENSE: A STUDY OF IT SECURITY EXPERTS,
PONEMON INSTITUTE 5 (Nov. 2012), https://security.radware.com/uploadedFiles/
Resources_and_Content/Attack_Tools/CyberSecurityontheOffense.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BNV6-YTZK].
313 Joe Gervais, Hack Away, Kid: How Schools Can Teach Students to Become
Ethical Hackers (and Protect Their Systems in the Process), SLATE (May 11, 2015, 9:18 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/05/schools_should_teach_
students_to_be_ethical_hackers.html [https://perma.cc/93W9-2AT6]; Steve Morgan,
Hacker High School Teaches Cyber Security Skills to Teens, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2016, 8:23
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/03/20/hacker-high-school-teachescyber-security-skills-to-teens/#3cb65d154d50
[https://perma.cc/ES86-E6BT];
Mariya
Pylayev, H.S. Cyber Security Program Aims to Recruit Girls, Minorities with Fun, Ethical
Hacking Skills, AOL NEWS (Feb. 3, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www.aol.com/2014/02/03/stemcyber-security-program-girls-minorities-ethical-hacking/ [https://perma.cc/BEV9-XCKH].
314 Regina D. Hartley, Ethical Hacking Pedagogy: An Analysis and Overview
of Teaching Students to Hack, 24 J. INT’L TECH. & INFO. MGMT. 95, 101 (2015)
(collecting research and noting that “thinking like a hacker and acting like an ‘ethical
hacker’ is a critical skill for a successful career in security for web applications”).
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Council on Education, the Association of Public and LandGrant Universities, and Educause, which continue to hope for
“[S]ection 1201 liability [limited] to circumvention only where
the act of circumvention results in infringement” as currently
Section 1201 is “inherently prejudicial to innovative
educational approaches.”315
V.

CRITICISMS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The likely criticisms of this article’s proposal center on
its feasibility, the adequacy of the current review process, and
the proposal’s overall impact on safety.
A.

Change of the DMCA Is Unfeasible in Light of
Stakeholder Power and Treaty Obligations

A potential criticism of the proposed approach is that it
is simply not feasible in light of powerful rights-holders’
concerns and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
treaty requirements.316 Critics would rightly point to the failure
of recent attempts to address these issues legislatively: for
example, H.R. 1587: Unlocking Technology Act of 2015317 and
H.R. 1883: Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act of 2015318
never made it out of committee, though each proposed
somewhat similar solutions to the first plank of the proposal.
While there are powerful interests combating the
outright removal of Section 1201, the recent failures did not
occur in the backdrop of foundational attacks against the
electoral integrity of the Republic or national hospital
networks. The recent spate of exemptions, along with critical
governmental reports, demonstrates a newfound awareness of
institutional actors that may facilitate change.319 The sobering
results of voter machine hacking, along with a strong reaction

315 The Association of American Universities, the American Council on
Education, The Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities, and Educause,
Comment Letter on Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act—Sixth
Triennial DMCA Rulemaking 3, 6 (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.aau.edu/
sites/default/files/AAU%20Files/Key%20Issues/Intellectual%20Property/EDU-AAU-ACEAPLU-Comment-SEC-1201-DMCA_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM9H-ELNJ].
316 Samuelson, supra note 147, at 370–71.
317 Unlocking Technology Act of 2015, H.R.1587, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1587?q=H.R.+%201587 [https://
perma.cc/BF2V-B73X].
318 Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act of 2015, H.R. 1883, 114th Cong.
(2015), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1883 [https://perma.cc/BKD6-9WJQ].
319 See supra Section III.B.
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to foreign meddling in American electoral systems, may create
a more amenable environment.
As to the requirements of WIPO, notwithstanding the
grandiose statements during DMCA’s drafting, there is nothing
in the treaty that obligates barring the act of circumvention
attendant to lawful activities.320 WIPO requirements could be,
and indeed are, satisfied by interpretations of an anticircumvention
right that is dependent on underlying copyrights.321
B.

Incremental Progress in Triennial Review Is Measured
and Responsive

Proponents of the DMCA may also argue that the
granting of specific exemptions is a more measured approach.
In the face of likely resistance to wholesale change of the
DMCA, critics of the proposal could point to the triennial
process as an effective way to adapt to a changing technological
environment while respecting the rights of rights holders.
This criticism ignores the long lag in the review process,
the inherently arbitrary nature of exemptions, and the failure
to inspire research that may rely on re-criminalized activity at
the expiration of the exemption. The current exemption for
good faith security researchers may represent a small step in
the right direction, though it has several troubling limitations,
not least of which is that it must be renewed every three years.
Most troubling is that the exemption process appears to
be reactive, waiting for initial threats to spill over into realworld consequences before easing research restrictions. This
pattern is evident from the recent exemption regarding
exploring software used in motor vehicles and consumer
products.
The motor vehicle exemption appears to have been
motivated by a demonstration by researchers of a vulnerability
that hackers could use to wirelessly car jack and potentially
kill a moving vehicle. In this case, researchers remotely
commandeered and killed a Jeep travelling on the freeway.
Specifically, “the two hackers remotely toyed with the airconditioning, radio, and windshield wipers . . . [before] cut[ting]
320 Jonathan Band & Taro Isshiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provision in
the Copyright Act: A Flawed First Step, 3 No. 11 CYBERSPACE L. 2 (1999) (explaining
that the DMCA’s anticircumvention regulations were not required for compliance with
the WIPO Copyright Treaty); Samuelson, supra note 180 at 537 (“Administration
officials admitted in Congressional testimony that its preferred legislation went beyond
what the WIPO Copyright Treaty required.”). See generally Samuelson, supra note 147
(discussing the negotiations leading to conclusion of the WIPO Copyright Treaty).
321 Samuelson, supra note 147, at 409–13.
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the transmission.”322 The vulnerability was present in cars that
had the “Sprint-powered Uconnect feature and . . . 8.4-inch
touchscreen systems. . . . includ[ing] Ram, Cherokee, Grand
Cherokee, Durango, Viper, Challenger, and Chrysler models.”323
The revelation caused the recall of over one million cars and
prompted outcry for a DMCA exception.
The Volkswagen emissions fraud, commonly known as
Dieselgate, may also have helped the proposed exemption.
Volkswagen, in an effort to appear to meet emissions standards
on their “clean diesel” line—cars with turbocharged direct
injection (TDI) diesel engines—programmed their cars to
trigger a low-performance, low-emissions mode only during
laboratory emissions testing.324 The software would recognize a
testing condition through “the position of the steering wheel,
vehicle speed, the duration of the engine’s operation, and
barometric pressure.” 325 The software would then trigger the
artificially low emissions mode.326 The effects of the software
were noticed when researchers discovered a large discrepancy
between their road emissions tests and laboratory tests. As
part of a plea deal, Volkswagen was ordered “to pay a $2.8
billion criminal fine for rigging diesel-powered vehicles to cheat
on government emissions tests.”327 The Electronic Frontier
Foundation correctly noted that had gearhead hackers been
allowed to investigate the software on their own cars,
Volkswagen’s deceit would have been uncovered much
sooner.328

322 Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me
in It, WIRED (July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackersremotely-kill-jeep-highway/ [https://perma.cc/5E9B-URUH]; Sharon Shea, Alleged Car
Hack Prompts Call for Vehicle Security Act, DMCA Exemption, TECHTARGET (July 24,
2015),
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/4500250530/Alleged-car-hackprompts-call-for-vehicle-security-act-DMCA-exemption [https://perma.cc/CYJ8-UDWL].
323 Eduard Kovacs, Feedback Friday: Industry Reactions to Remote Car
Hacking, SECURITYWEEK (July 24, 2015), http://www.securityweek.com/feedbackfriday-industry-reactions-remote-car-hacking [https://perma.cc/3DYE-4GGQ].
324 James Grimmelmann, The VW Scandal Is Just the Beginning, MOTHERJONES
(Sept. 24, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2015/09/volkswagendefeat-device-copyright-harry-potter/ [https://perma.cc/F7ER-HPWU].
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Christina Rogers & Mike Spector, Judge Slaps VW with $2.8 Billion
Criminal Fine in Emissions Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2017, 1:37 PM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-slaps-vw-with-2-8-billion-criminal-fine-in-emissions
-fraud-1492789096 [https://perma.cc/K8Z2-VGX4].
328 Kit Walsh, Researchers Could Have Uncovered Volkswagen’s Emissions
Cheat if Not Hindered by the DMCA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG
(Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/09/researchers-could-have-uncoveredvolkswagens-emissions-cheat-if-not-hindered-dmca [https://perma.cc/7ZWJ-ML63].
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The exemption for investigation of consumer goods was
likely tied to the rise of malware infecting and enslaving
consumer products. Hackers then directed these devices to
unleash enormous waves of traffic to overwhelm servers and
cause outages. The occurrence of huge botnets329 made up
primarily of poorly defended internet-connected consumer
goods (so-called Internet-of-Things Botnets) is an enormous
security threat, as 2015 saw an increasing wave of DDoS
attacks from infected devices. Earlier that year, the first IoT
botnet made up primarily of infected routers was reported and
attributed to the LizardStresser botnet.330
Unfortunately, the exemption was subject to a one-year
delay, during which time the size and strength of IoT botnets
only grew. In October 2016,331 a widespread DDoS attack332 was
launched against Dyn, a manager of the DNS network.333 This
brought down “Twitter, the Guardian, Netflix, Reddit, [and]
CNN, [among] others in Europe and the United States.”334
Commentators noted that “hundreds of thousands of websites
became unreachable”335 and that “half the internet shut
down.”336 The attack was the largest of its kind, involving

329 A botnet is composed of bots. Bots or zombies are enslaved devices that act
in concert to achieve a purpose. Brett Stone-Gross et al., Your Botnet is My Botnet:
Analysis of A Botnet Takeover, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ACM CONFERENCE ON
COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (2009), https://www.fbiic.gov/public/2009/
may/torpig.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTR5-MEU9]; Nick Clayton, Where to Rent a Botnet
for $2 an Hour or Buy One for $700, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2012, 9:43 AM GMT),
http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2012/11/05/where-to-rent-a-botnet-for-2-an-hour-or-buyone-for-700/ [https://perma.cc/TA8L-V9WG].
330 Tom Spring, LizardStresser IoT Botnet Part of 400Gbps DDoS Attacks,
THREATPOST (June 30, 2016, 7:00 PM), https://threatpost.com/lizardstresser-iot-botnetpart-of-400gbps-ddos-attacks/119006/ [https://perma.cc/M75G-ZXYA].
331 UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, ALERT-TA16288A, HEIGHTENED DDOS THREAT POSED BY MIRAI AND OTHER BOTNETS (Oct. 17,
2017), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-288A [https://perma.cc/DW3T-GGDE].
332 Michael Kan, DDoS Attack on Dyn Came from 100,000 Infected Devices,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 26, 2016, 2:21 PM PT), http://www.computerworld.com/article/
3135434/security/ddos-attack-on-dyn-came-from-100000-infected-devices.html [https://
perma.cc/63B2-TBS7] (noting that attack originated from 100,000 infected devices).
333 Scott Hilton, Dyn Analysis Summary of Friday October 21 Attack, DYN (Oct.
26, 2016), http://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-october-21-attack/ [https://
perma.cc/H4QX-4KD2].
334 Nicky Woolf, DDoS Attack That Disrupted Internet Was Largest of Its Kind in
History, Experts Say, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2016, 16:42 EDT), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/26/ddos-attack-dyn-mirai-botnet
[https://
perma.cc/GN89-JQVK].
335 Daniel Smith, How Friday’s Massive DDoS Attack on the U.S. Happened,
RADWARE, (Oct. 23, 2016), https://blog.radware.com/security/2016/10/fridays-massiveddos-attack-u-s-happened/ [https://perma.cc/2QHV-7L8D].
336 William Turton, This Is Why Half the Internet Shut Down Today, GIZMODO
(Oct. 21, 2016, 8:36 AM), http://gizmodo.com/this-is-probably-why-half-the-internet-shutdown-today-1788062835 [https://perma.cc/X983-ZVWA].
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primarily-IoT Botnet Mirai traffic of 1.2 terabytes per second.337
Numerous industry sectors have noted their vulnerability to
DDoS attacks, characterizing the Dyn attack as a “practice
run” by hackers338 and predicted that 2017 would see even more
DDoS attacks.339 It is a sad state of affairs when defenders are
constrained until initially successful attacks are discovered.
C.

Encouraging Malicious Hacking

Critics may argue that the relaxation of Section 1201
will encourage hacking by malicious actors, erasing any gains
accrued through greater academic openness. Of course, the
larger question of the impact of academic openness always
warrants further study. This specific argument, however,
reflects two fundamental misunderstandings: (1) the belief that
malicious hackers are somehow dissuaded by DMCA penalties,
and (2) a security through obscurity position that is untenable
in the digital world. Malicious hackers, especially those
employed by foreign governments, are not known to be very
responsive to domestic laws. It should be assumed that
underlying vulnerabilities will eventually be discovered—no
systems are truly secret—so we must not constrain defenders,
even at the risk of marginally incentivizing attackers.
CONCLUSION
While IP law is not often thought of in terms of national
security, the acute cyberwarfare climate requires a
reexamination of laws constraining the public’s role in national
defense. The DMCA has continued a deleterious trend of
inviting governmental regulation of needed encryption and
security research, inherited from a century-old doctrine
originally concerned with biplanes and propeller-mounted
machine guns. This security through obscurity approach must
be abandoned. By removing independent anticircumvention
provisions while encouraging greater communication between
the security community and product vendors, we will harness
the energy of researchers and altruistic hackers alike. In the
Hilton, supra note 333.
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face of unprecedented attacks, we must not mistake a veil of
secrecy as a wall of security nor imagine that our
vulnerabilities will disappear provided we keep our eyes shut.

